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Ben Walther* 
ABSTRACT 
This article argues that Delaware corporate law permits shareholders 
to use bylaws to circumscribe the managerial authority of the board 
of directors. While shareholders cannot mandate action by the board, 
they can enact specific prohibitions on its behavior, so long as the 
board retains enough discretion to implement—in practice, not 
merely in theory—its managerial policies by other means. The use of 
such circumscribing bylaws to discourage shirking (or analogous 
managerial abuses) by the directors or officers resembles the use of 
negative covenants in debt contracts that seek to prevent the debtor 
from squandering assets. Bylaw governance thus subtly but 
significantly reallocates governance power within the corporation, so 
as to reduce the agency costs of management. Its legal validity 
should also prompt courts and scholars alike to focus less on the 
quantity of power wielded by the shareholders, and more on the 
ways that power can be configured to produce managerial 
efficiencies. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Shareholder bylaw power under Delaware corporate law has long 
been ill-defined. Section 109(b) of the Delaware General Corporate Law 
(“DGCL”) states, rather unhelpfully, that almost any shareholder-
enacted bylaw is valid if it is not “inconsistent with law.” It also says 
nothing about what consistency with law means. It can be inferred that 
bylaws must respect the basic corporate principle of separated 
ownership and control. Indeed, it is widely accepted that bylaws cannot 
validly arrogate for shareholders the power to manage the business and 
affairs of the corporation, as that authority is granted exclusively to the 
board of directors.1 At the same time, shareholders must be able to do 
something meaningful with their expressly non-derogable and expansive 
power to enact bylaws that “relat[e] to the business of the corporation, 
the conduct of its affairs, and its rights or powers or the rights or powers 
of its stockholders, directors, officers or employees.”2 
This article represents the first comprehensive analysis of 
shareholder bylaws since the landmark Delaware Supreme Court (“the 
Court”3) opinion in CA, Inc. v. AFSCME.4 It shows that shareholders’ 
inalienable power to amend corporate bylaws gives them the ability to 
enact what might be called circumscribing bylaws—that is, provisions 
that place substantive limits on the board’s decision-making without 
narrowing the scope of the directors’ managerial authority over 
corporate policy and action. Circumscribing bylaws cannot force 
decisions on the board; they can prohibit ways of implementing the 
                                                                                                                 
 1. See, e.g., John C. Coates IV & Bradley Faris, Second Generation By-Laws: 
Post-Quickturn Alternatives, 56 BUS. LAW. 1323, 1326 (2001) (noting that bylaws that 
“conflict with the board’s authority under section 141(a) . . . to manage the business and 
affairs of the corporation” are likely invalid); Jeffrey N. Gordon, “Just Say Never?” 
Poison Pills, Deadhand Pills, and Shareholder-Adopted Bylaws: An Essay for Warren 
Buffett, 19 CARDOZO L. REV. 511, 546-47 (1997) (noting that the validity of bylaws are 
restricted the grant of managerial authority to the board under § 141(a)). 
 2. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 109(b). 
 3. This Article does not refer to the U.S. Supreme Court, so this shorthand form is 
available for other use. 
 4. 953 A.2d 227 (2008). 
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board’s judgment. The argument here is necessarily predictive in nature, 
as the Delaware courts have not expressly set forth a coherent 
framework for evaluating the legality of bylaws. Still, the 
circumscribing bylaw theory reconciles what otherwise appears to be a 
bewildering morass of inconsistent and sometimes incoherent cases—in 
particular, the convoluted5 CA opinion and the important but similarly 
opaque Chancery Court case of UniSuper, Ltd v. News Corp.6 Moreover, 
the 2014 opinion in ATP Tour, Inc. v. Deutscher Tennis Bund appears to 
be moving the law in this direction.7 
This Article also addresses the implications of the shareholders’ 
power to enact circumscribing bylaws, and how traditional corporate 
governance becomes supplemented by what might be called bylaw 
governance (“BG”). In particular, circumscribing bylaws provide 
shareholders with a conduit of direct authority useful for taking action 
against managerial ‘shirking.’8 The conduit must be narrow and it must 
leave control of the firm in the hands of the directors, who are the actors 
best-positioned to make sound business decisions.9 Shareholders are 
                                                                                                                 
 5. Even Justice Jacobs admitted, in a talk at Harvard Law School, that the CA 
opinion he authored was not “necessarily the best way [the case] could have been 
handled.” In part, the rushed procedural posture of the case negatively impacted the 
clarity of the resulting opinion. In Justice Jacobs’ words, “if we had more than two 
weeks and were not under the pressure of time . . . we might have been able to write 
[the opinion] better.” What the Court produced was not necessarily “the best way it 
could have been handled.” For documentation of Jacobs’ remarks, see Sabrina Ursaner, 
Keeping “Fiduciary Outs” Out of Shareholder-Proposed Bylaws: An Analysis of CA, 
Inc. v. AFSCME, 6 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 479, 507-08 (2010). 
 6. No. 1699-N, 2005 Del. Ch. LEXIS 205 (Del. Ch. Dec. 20, 2005). As explained 
infra note 17, there are actually two UniSuper opinions: the original opinion in the case, 
and a subsequent opinion certifying the legal issues for interlocutory review. As it 
happened, the second opinion substantially revised the holding of the first, which has 
generally inhibited a clear understanding of the case holding. 
 7. 91 A.3d 554 (Del. 2014). 
 8. In this Article, ‘shirking’ is used as a term of art to refer to the pursuit of 
personal wealth or happiness by managers or directors at the expense of the companies 
they govern and/or the investors in those companies. Some scholars prefer a narrower, 
more traditional usage of the word ‘shirking’ to mean the substitution of leisure for 
work, but broad usage is hardly uncommon. See, e.g., Stephen A. Bainbridge, 
Corporation Law and Economics 35-36 (2002) (defining “shirking” to “include any 
action by a member of a production team that diverges from the interests of the team as 
a whole . . . [including] not only culpable cheating, but also negligence, oversight, 
incapacity, and even honest mistakes”). 
 9. See, e.g., Iman Anabtawi, Some Skepticism About Increasing Shareholder 
Power, 53 UCLA L. REV. 561 (2006) (collecting a number of persuasive arguments 
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simply not well-positioned to take an active role in company 
management,10 and any governance system that confers on them the 
power to override the board’s considered opinion invites “waste and 
disruption.”11 However, shareholders might be better situated to detect 
destructive decision-making processes and inefficient governance 
practices than the board,12 and they certainly have more incentive to 
curtail opportunism or rent-seeking by insiders. Circumscribing bylaws 
gives shareholders just enough direct influence over management to 
curtail such abuses, while preserving the large universe of functionally 
substitutable13 policy options from which the board can choose at its 
discretion. 
Part I establishes the statutory foundation and normative 
desirability of bylaw governance. It specifies what it means for a 
shareholder-enacted bylaw to circumscribe, but not compromise, the 
board’s discretion, and explains that the validity of such bylaws is 
implied by § 109 of the DGCL. It then sets forth the principal normative 
argument: BG can reduce certain types of agency costs that are 
                                                                                                                 
against governance proposals that give shareholders greater power over corporate 
management). Perhaps the best argument against shareholder involvement is that 
shareholders should not want to manage the firm, since most know relatively little 
about the business and are not professional executives. 
 10. For an argument that shareholders cannot efficiently formulate corporate 
policy, see Stephen Bainbridge, The Case for Limited Shareholder Voting Rights, 53 
UCLA L. REV. 601, 608-10 (2006) (describing the “inefficiency of multiple 
constituency” decision-making). See also Brent H. McDonnell, Shareholder Bylaws, 
Shareholder Nominations, and Poison Pills, 3 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 205, 237 (2005) 
(noting that very few people would disagree that “in a public corporation . . . it makes 
no sense for shareholders to engage in ordinary decision making”). 
 11. See Martin Lipton & William Savitt, The Many Myths of Lucian Bebchuk, 93 
VA. L. REV. 733, 743-44 (May 2007) (arguing that increases in shareholder voting 
powers will exact large costs “in corporate dollars wasted” on proxy contests and 
“perpetual management distraction”). 
 12. Professors Brachton and Wachter observe that a shareholder-based agency 
model of the corporation sends management a simple instruction: “in all circumstances, 
manage to maximize the market price of the stock. And that is exactly what managers 
of some critical financial firms did . . . while fail[ing] to factor in concomitant increases 
in risk that went largely unobserved.” See William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, 
The Case Against Shareholder Empowerment, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 653, 658-59 (2010). 
This is but one illustration of the danger that can arise when shareholders’ interests are 
represented only indirectly in the governance process. 
 13. “Functionally substitutable” is a rough approximation of the actual standard, 
explained in more detail in Part I.A. 
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generally unaffected by equity or incentive-based compensation, and 
can do so less intrusively than conventional shareholder-oriented 
governance systems. BG asks courts and scholars not to think of 
corporate governance as a zero-sum game in which power transferred to 
shareholders necessarily comes at the expense of the board, or vice 
versa. The quantity of power allocated to each group is far less 
important than the quality of that power. Because the board’s power 
over corporate decision-making is nearly infinite,14 it will never be 
compromised by a handful of targeted restrictions. It can be redirected 
toward more efficient mechanisms of effectuating the board’s business 
judgments. 
Part II develops the central positive argument in favor of BG, 
which is that the enforceability of circumscribing bylaws is implied by 
Delaware case law. CA established that shareholder-enacted bylaws are 
valid when they pass a two-prong test: (1) they must be within the 
“scope or reach” of the shareholders’ bylaw power, and (2) they must 
not impermissibly intrude upon the managerial authority granted to the 
board by § 141(a).15 The opinion, however, provides only a confusing 
and sometimes incoherent account of what these two prongs mean.16 It 
makes the most sense when considered in light of the distinction 
between circumscribing and controlling bylaws. To say that a bylaw is 
within the “scope or reach” of the shareholders’ bylaw power is to say 
that it has a circumscribing purpose—i.e. that it does not seek to 
mandate board action. To say that it is consistent with § 141(a) is to say 
that it also has a circumscribing effect. This distinction between 
circumscribing and controlling bylaws also animates other important 
decisions that address the proper allocation of authority between the 
shareholders and the board.17 
                                                                                                                 
 14. That is, the number of business decisions available to the board at any given 
time or on any given issue is, for all practical purposes, without limit. For instance, the 
CEO can be replaced by one of potentially thousands of candidates; the assets of the 
company can be organized, sold, or augmented in countless ways; the firm can enter or 
exit any number of markets or sub-markets, and so on. 
 15. CA, Inc. v. AFSCME Emps. Pension Plan, 953 A.2d 227, 232 (Del. 2008). 
 16. In his talk at Harvard Law School, Justice Jacobs admitted that the procedural 
posture of the case influenced (in a negative way) the Court’s exposition of the issues. 
See supra note 5. 
 17. Other than CA, the greatest attention is given to Frantz Mfg. Co. v. EAC Indus., 
501 A.2d 401 (Del. 1985), Quickturn Design Sys. v. Mentor Graphics, Inc., 721 A.2d 
1281 (Del. 1998), and the pair of decisions in the case of UniSuper, Ltd v. News Corp., 
No. 1699-N, 2005 Del. Ch. LEXIS 205 (Del. Ch. Dec. 20, 2005), and No. 1699-N, 
2006 Del. Ch. LEXIS 11 (Del. Ch. Jan. 19, 2006). 
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I. BYLAW GOVERNANCE: AN OVERVIEW 
As used here, the phrase bylaw governance (“BG”) describes a 
variant of the prevailing Delaware corporate governance model18 in 
which shareholders may exert authority over corporate affairs by 
promulgating bylaws that circumscribe the board’s exercise of its 
authority. Such bylaws specify certain types of actions that management 
cannot take, and critically, have binding legal effect that can be enforced 
in court. The fundamental tenet of BG is that bylaws are valid as to any 
issue19 so long as they are consistent with the certificate of incorporation 
and preserve nearly all20 of the board’s discretion to act according to its 
best business judgment. 
                                                                                                                 
 18. I refer here to the governance principles established in positive law by statute 
or case law, along with corollaries that would be accepted by most observers (though 
disputes may rage on normative issues). These include the propositions that: (a) 
management power is vested in the board of directors; (b) shareholders’ inalienable 
right to guide corporate policy is limited to selecting directors and voting on specific 
matters as provided by statute; (c) a central role of the board of directors is to supervise 
and oversee the performance of the company’s officers; and (d) directors’ fiduciary 
duties run to the shareholders in the first instance. See generally Stephen Bainbridge, 
Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of Corporate Governance, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 
547 (2003) (describing the implications of modeling the firm as a nexus of contracts); 
Jill Fisch, Corporate Governance: Taking Boards Seriously, 19 CARDOZO L. REV. 265 
(1997) (describing the managing and monitoring duties of the board); Leo E. Strine, 
Toward a True Corporate Republic: A Traditionalist Response to Bebchuk’s Solution 
for Improving Corporate America, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1759 (2006) (stating the 
Delaware vice-chancellor’s exposition of the traditional norms of corporate 
governance); Henry Hansmann & Rainer Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate 
Law, 89 GEO. L.J. 439 (2001) (describing the convergence of corporate governance 
systems worldwide toward a loosely defined “standard model” of shareholder-oriented 
but director-managed corporate governance); Martin Lipton & Jay W. Lorsch, A 
Modest Proposal for Improved Corporate Governance, 48 BUS. LAW. 59 (1992) 
(outlining a set of governance proposals as to board function and composition that were 
widely accepted in the years after it was published). 
 19. Any issue, in theory. But most ordinary business decisions will not be easily 
subject to circumscribing bylaws. See infra notes 57-59 and accompanying text. 
 20. The words “very nearly” perhaps understate the case. The central idea is that 
the board’s managerial power is not diminished by prohibitions on specific, identifiable 
actions. At most, the directors could lose the unchecked power to adopt their favorite 
alternative of many roughly equivalent options. Such power may permit directors or 
other corporate insiders to extract rents—perhaps subconsciously—even when they 
remain faithful to the corporations’ best interests. See infra notes 88-90 and 
accompanying text. 
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A. THE STATUTORY BASIS OF BG 
The primary statutory basis for BG is section 109 of the Delaware 
General Corporate Law (“DGCL”), which defines the corporate bylaw 
power. Section 109(a) establishes that: 
After a corporation . . . has received any payment for any of its 
stock, the power to adopt, amend or repeal bylaws shall be in the 
stockholders entitled to vote. Notwithstanding the foregoing, any 
corporation may, in its certificate of incorporation, confer the power 
to adopt, amend or repeal bylaws upon the directors . . . . The fact 
that such power has been so conferred upon the directors . . . shall 
not divest the stockholders . . . of the power, nor limit their power to 
adopt, amend or repeal bylaws.21 
In recent scholarship, Professors Gordon Smith and Christopher 
Bruner have separately noted that § 109(a) vests shareholders with an 
inherent authority over the bylaws that the certificate may not limit.22 
However, the issue may be more complex than they let on. The statutory 
text states only that the granting of bylaw power to the board does not 
itself divest shareholders of their bylaw power. Nowhere does § 109(a) 
address whether the shareholders’ bylaw power can be separately 
compromised by a certificate provision expressly devoted to that end. 
Indeed, one could interpret the concluding sentence as merely a 
clarification that the bylaw power can in fact be concurrent; without 
such an explicit statutory command, courts and companies might have 
concluded that the granting of bylaw power to the board removes it from 
shareholders. 
Still, a careful statutory analysis reaches the same conclusion as 
Professors Smith and Bruner. While § 109(a) may not expressly prohibit 
the divesture of the shareholders’ bylaw power in the certificate, neither 
does it authorize that divestiture. Thus, the authority to do so would 
have to come from some other provision of the DGCL. The most natural 
candidate would be § 102(b)(1), which permits the certificate to contain 
                                                                                                                 
 21. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 109. 
 22. See D. Gordon Smith, Matthew Wright, & Marcus Kai Hintze, Private 
Ordering with Shareholder Bylaws, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 125, 150 (2011) (arguing that 
“the concluding sentence of § 109(a) seems designed to drive the point home that 
shareholders have an immutable statutory power”); Christopher M. Bruner, Managing 
Corporate Federalism: The Least-Bad Approach to the Shareholder Bylaw Debate, 36 
DEL. J. CORP. L. 1, 6 (2011) (asserting that the corporate charter, per § 109(a) “may not 
limit the shareholders’ own bylaw authority”). 
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“any provision creating, defining, limiting and regulating the powers of 
the corporation, the directors, and the stockholders.”23 However, if this 
provision (or any other grant of authority) could apply to bylaws, then § 
109(a) would be redundant. Why would that section need to provide that 
“any corporation may, in its certificate of incorporation, confer the 
power to adopt, amend or repeal bylaws upon the directors” if 
§102(b)(1) already authorizes it? The doctrine of independent 
significance, a fundamental interpretive principle in Delaware,24 
suggests that § 109(a) must have a purpose—which is to say that it must 
authorize something that § 102(b)(1) does not. In addition, even if both 
sections were to establish that the certificate can grant bylaw power to 
the board, Delaware courts also apply the maxim that any conflict 
between two statutory sections should be resolved in favor of the more 
specific one.25 In this case, § 109(a) specifically declines to authorize the 
certificate to retract the shareholders’ bylaw power, and certainly 
implies—though does not expressly state—that the shareholders’ bylaw 
power cannot be compromised.26 For these reasons, it is safe to agree 
with the recent scholarship that the shareholders’ bylaw power is 
“sacrosanct.”27 
Section 109(b) presents a greater interpretive challenge. It provides 
that: 
(b) The bylaws may contain any provision, not inconsistent with law 
or with the certificate of incorporation, relating to the business of the 
corporation, the conduct of its affairs, and its rights or powers or the 
rights or powers of its stockholders, directors, officers or 
employees.28 
                                                                                                                 
 23. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(1). 
 24. On the significance of this doctrine in Delaware corporate law, see D. Gordon 
Smith, Independent Legal Significance, Good Faith and the Interpretation of Venture 
Capital Contracts, 40 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 825, 828-40 (2004). 
 25. See, e.g., Turnbull v. Fink, 668 A.2d 1370, 1377 (Del. 1995) (holding that 
when “two potentially conflicting statutes” cannot be reconciled, “the specific statute 
must prevail over the general”). 
 26. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 109(a). 
 27. See supra note 22. 
 28. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 109. 
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The interaction of this section with § 141(a)29 has been famously 
described as a “recursive loop.”30 According to this analysis, if 
shareholders enacted a bylaw pertaining to managerial decisions, it 
would violate the delegation of managerial authority to the board set 
forth in § 141(a). However, § 141(a)’s allocation of managerial power to 
the board can be curtailed by another provision of the DGCL—for 
instance, § 109(b) permits shareholders to enact bylaw provisions 
“relating to the business of the corporation.”31 Together, the two sections 
make clear that managers have exclusive managerial authority on all 
issues that lay beyond the shareholders’ bylaw power. Unfortunately, 
this is a tautology—every possible allocation of authority between 
directors and shareholders is consistent with the statutory language.32 
We know that there must be some decisions shareholders cannot make 
with their residual bylaw power, as corporations are not participatory 
democracies.33 But the line between valid and invalid bylaws does not 
appear to be demarcated by §109(b) and §141(a) alone. 
In the absence of determinate statutory language, various theories 
of bylaw validity have been constructed around policy considerations.34 
                                                                                                                 
 29. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (providing that “the business and affairs of 
every corporation . . . shall be managed by or under the direction of a board of 
directors,” unless otherwise provided by the DGCL). 
 30. See Jeffrey N. Gordon, “Just Say Never?” Poison Pills, Deadhand Pills, and 
Shareholder-Adopted Bylaws: An Essay for Warren Buffett, 19 CARDOZO L. REV. 511, 
546-47 (1997) (noting that any interpretation of the scope of the bylaw power runs into 
a “recursive loop,” because the bylaws are restricted by § 141(a), but § 141(a) is limited 
by other provisions in the DGCL, presumably including § 109). 
 31. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 109(b). 
 32. For instance, suppose A believes that compensation matters can be determined 
by shareholders under § 109(b). She would argue that the § 141(a) grant of exclusive 
authority to the board is limited by the grant of authority over compensation in § 
109(b). By contrast, if B believes that compensation is not within shareholders’ power, 
but business strategy is, he would make exactly the same argument, merely using the 
word strategy wherever A uses the word compensation. Both arguments have exactly 
the same truth value. The recursive loop provides no mechanism for preferring one 
argument over another, nor over C’s argument in which “compensation” is replaced by 
“nothing.” 
 33. See, e.g., Quickturn Design Sys. v. Mentor Graphics, Inc., 721 A.2d 1281, 
1291 (Del. 1998) (holding that “[o]ne of the most basic tenets of Delaware corporate 
law is that the board of directors has the ultimate responsibility for managing the 
business and affairs of a corporation[]” per § 141(a)). 
 34. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., The Bylaw Battlefield: Can Institutions Change 
the Outcome of Corporate Control Contests? 51 U. MIAMI L. REV. 605 (1997) 
(proposing ways to distinguish valid from invalid bylaws); McDonnell, supra note 10 at 
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These theories, however, have largely failed, because they turn on ad 
hoc distinctions between business decisions that are somehow ‘special’ 
enough to be regulated by shareholders, and the day-to-day decisions 
that entirely remain in the hands of the directors.35 For instance, it has 
been argued that bylaws are valid insofar as they address ‘special’ issues 
that are “fundamental” or “procedural,” or related to “corporate 
governance,” and invalid if they pertain to “ordinary,” “substantive,” or 
“business decisions.”36 However, it is optimistic to assume that clean 
taxonomies—or even ones that are not convoluted and cryptic—can be 
imposed on the wide range of actions that boards may take. Many 
decisions have many different ramifications, and thus can be both 
special and ordinary. For instance, determining executive compensation 
is a quintessentially managerial task and part of the more general issue 
of resource allocation within the firm. But that decision also 
disproportionately influences the basic nature of the shareholders’ 
investment, as it affects the future direction of the company, the risk-
tolerance of executives, and its responsiveness to shareholders’ interests. 
To argue that compensation is (or is not) shareholder-actionable is 
simply to privilege, without basis in statute or case law, one of these 
different aspects of the compensation decision. 
This Article contends that the interaction between § 109(b) and § 
141(a) is greatly clarified by the oft-ignored § 109(a). That latter 
provision holds the key to determining bylaw validity—not because of 
the rule it sets forth, but rather because it sets forth a mandatory rule. 
Mandatory rules of corporate law are precious. Most provisions of the 
DGCL establish default rules that can be modified by the certificate. 
Only three other corporate governance rules37 are mandatory and non-
waivable, each one applying to issues of the utmost importance to 
                                                                                                                 
237 & 251 (summarizing the views of scholars on the subject of bylaw validity and 
arguing that the validity of a bylaw should turn on whether it pertains to corporate 
governance). 
 35. For a critique of such distinctions as ad hoc, and a view that bylaws seeking to 
control director authority are anachronistic, see Lawrence A. Hammermesh, Corporate 
Democracy and Shareholder-Adopted Bylaws: Taking Back the Street?, 73 TUL. L. 
REV. 409, 433-46 (1998). 
 36. See Coffee, supra note 34, at 613-15. 
 37. This specifically refers to rules that allocate power between the board, the 
officers, and the shareholders. 
2015] BYLAW GOVERNANCE 409 
shareholders:38 the shareholders’ merger veto must be preserved;39 
charter amendments are subject to shareholder approval;40 and the 
shareholders must be permitted to inspect the books and records.41 Many 
indisputably weighty matters do not receive this level of protection. For 
instance, the allocation of managerial authority to the board can be 
modified by charter,42 and voting rights can be eliminated for some 
classes of stock.43 It would therefore be logical to expect that the 
                                                                                                                 
 38. See Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Mandatory Structure of Corporate Law, 89 
COLUM. L. REV. 1549, 1554 n.16 (1989). As Professor Gordon notes, there are other 
mandatory provisions, but these are not rules so much as limitations or qualifications of 
powers that are purely optional. For instance, if the company wants a staggered board, a 
maximum of three classes can be created; if the board or shareholders wants to delegate 
board power to a committee, that delegation cannot include decisions over mergers or 
bylaw amendments, etc. Gordon cites the rule that derivative suits cannot be brought 
without prior demand on the board, but that is a rule of civil procedure, not of the 
DGCL. See Del. Ct. Ch. R. 23.1(a) (a derivative suit “complaint shall also allege with 
particularity the efforts, if any, made by the plaintiff to obtain the action the plaintiff 
desires from the directors”). There is also the appraisal right, see DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, 
§ 262, which cannot be waived as such in the charter. But the appraisal right is not 
available for publicly traded companies in stock-for-stock deals. Thus, the board can 
avoid the appraisal right at its discretion; far from being non-waivable, the appraisal 
right is, in an important sense, optional. 
 39. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 251(c) (providing that a merger agreement shall 
become effective only when “a majority of the outstanding stock of [each] corporation 
entitled to vote thereon shall be voted for the adoption of the agreement”); DEL. CODE 
ANN. tit. 8, § 271(a) (“Every corporation may . . . sell, lease or exchange all or 
substantially all of its property and assets . . . when and as authorized by a resolution 
adopted by the holders of a majority of the outstanding stock of the corporation entitled 
to vote . . . .”). 
 40. All charter amendments must be ratified by the shareholders. DEL. CODE ANN. 
tit. 8, § 242(b)(1). In addition, charter amendments that adversely affect the rights or 
economic interests of a particular class of stock must be ratified by a majority vote of 
that class. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 242(b)(2). 
 41. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 220(b). 
 42. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (“The business and affairs of every 
corporation organized under this chapter shall be managed by or under the direction of 
a board of directors, except as may be otherwise provided in this chapter or in its 
certificate of incorporation.”). 
 43. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 212(a) (“Unless otherwise provided in the certificate 
of incorporation . . . each stockholder shall be entitled to 1 vote for each share of capital 
stock held by such stockholder.”). Non-voting common stock is not frequently issued, 
but it does occasionally show up in the case law. See, e.g., In re Frederick’s of 
Hollywood, Inc., No. C.A. 15944, 2000 WL 130630, at *2 (Del. Ch. Jan. 31, 2000) 
(“As of December 6, 1996, Frederick’s had issued and outstanding . . . 5,903,118 shares 
of Class B common stock (which were non-voting) that were held by approximately 
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shareholders’ inviolate bylaw power would carry considerable 
significance. It would make little sense for the legislature to build a 
fortress around a power that could be exercised only with respect to 
isolated and largely trivial issues such as establishing the board’s 
quorum.44 
In other words, the bylaw power should be interpreted to protect the 
shareholders’ essential interest in preventing gross mismanagement. 
Admittedly, § 109 provides no textual foundation for such a claim, but 
the existence and nature of such an interest can be inferred by analogy. 
Each of the other mandatory rules protects the shareholders’ investment 
from being spoiled by the faithlessness or negligence of the board. The 
shareholder veto over mergers protects the shareholders from being 
forced to sell their equity at a lowball price;45 the veto over charter 
amendments protects the shareholders from the curtailment of essential 
rights;46 and the right to inspect the books gives shareholders the ability 
to detect misappropriation of corporate funds by the board.47 These 
rights were made non-waivable to guard against opportunism by the 
board and/or powerful insider shareholders, who otherwise might 
                                                                                                                 
504 shareholders of record.”). Preferred stock frequently is stripped of voting rights. It 
is unclear if a corporation can eliminate voting rights from all classes of its equity 
securities. 
 44. Cf. CA, Inc. v. AFSCME Emps. Pension Plan, 953 A.2d 227, 235 (Del. 2008) 
(noting that § 141(b) “authorizes bylaws that fix the number of directors on the board, 
[and] the number of directors required for a quorum (with certain limitations)”). 
 45. See Gordon, supra note 38, at 1593 (noting that “[t]ransactions that transform 
the economic structure of the firm” such as mergers or asset sales are subject to non-
waivable rules because such transactions can “tilt economic payoffs in a large-scale 
way”). 
 46. Id. at 1591 (arguing that charter amendments should be viewed “in the same 
light as a merger between a parent and a partially owned subsidiary”). Charters also 
specify liquidation preferences. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 151(a), 242(a)(3) 
(specifying that designations and preferences shall be stated and expressed in the 
certificate of incorporation, and that the certificate can be amended to change the par 
value, preferences or designations of shares). Thus, shareholders without a veto power 
over certificate amendments could find their preferences eliminated, or alternately, their 
residual interests crushed underneath a mountain of preferred stock. 
 47. See, e.g., ATR-Kim Eng Fin. Corp. v. Araneta, No. 489-N, 2006 Del. Ch. 
LEXIS 215, at *20-25 (Del. Ch. Dec. 21, 2006) (describing how a minority shareholder 
used a “books and records” request to discover that the majority shareholder had 
secretly stripped assets from the corporation and diverted them to his family members). 
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pressure or deceive shareholders into alienating them.48 Consequently, 
the bylaw power should protect against some similarly severe loss of 
equity value that shareholders might not otherwise be able to prevent. 
Indeed, the importance of such protection follows directly from the 
business judgment rule, which insulates directors from liability for their 
bad managerial decisions. Chancellor Allen has eloquently explained 
why shareholders should not want the ability to sue directors merely for 
making risky investment decisions: as a group, shareholders generally 
profit when the board takes risks, and a rule that holds the board 
responsible for answering for risks gone awry would chill the very 
behavior that shareholders want to promote.49 However, this astute 
reasoning tells us only that shareholders should not want the right to 
hold the board liable ex post. It does not mean they should be indifferent 
to the board’s foolishness. It is often said that the shareholders’ chief 
remedy for inadequate performance of management is the power of the 
franchise—the ability to remove underperforming directors from the 
board.50 Nowhere is it written that this removal power—largely a 
                                                                                                                 
 48. See Gordon, supra note 38, at 1574-75. In re Delphi Financial Group 
Shareholder Litigation, No. 7144-VCG, 2012 Del. Ch. LEXIS 45 (Del. Ch. 2012) 
describes an interesting example of such pressure. There, the founder, CEO and 
controlling shareholder of Delphi Financial essentially forced the public shareholders to 
repeal a certificate provision preventing him from obtaining a control premium for his 
shares in a proposed acquisition. In re Delphi Financial Group Shareholder Litigation, 
No. 7144-VCG, 2012 Del. Ch. LEXIS 45 at *3 (Del. Ch. 2012). That provision had 
been added to the charter when the company was taken public in 1990, presumably as a 
sale of the control premium right during the IPO. Id. at *3. Twenty years later, the 
controlling shareholder refused to permit the company to be sold—at an approximately 
100% premium to market!—unless that provision was eliminated to allow him to 
receive an even higher price. Id. at *3-4. What choice did the board have, but to put the 
certificate amendment to the shareholders, and what choice did the shareholders have 
but to approve? On those facts, shareholders might be protected by fiduciary duties; the 
allegations in Delphi that the controller had acted in bad faith survived a motion to 
dismiss. The opinion’s reasoning gives little reason to think that its holding would 
apply far beyond the specific facts.  
 49. See Gagliardi v. TriFoods Int’l, Inc., 683 A.2d 1049, 1052-55 (Del. Ch. 1996). 
 50. See, e.g., MM Cos. v. Liquid Audio, Inc., 813 A.2d 1118, 1127 (Del. 2003) 
(noting that “[the Delaware Supreme] Court has repeatedly stated that, if the 
stockholders are not satisfied with the management or actions of their elected 
representatives on the board of directors, the power of corporate democracy is available 
to the stockholders to replace the incumbent directors”); Blasius Indus. v. Atlas Corp., 
564 A.2d 651, 659 (noting that “[g]enerally, shareholders have only two protections 
against perceived inadequate business performance. They may sell their stock . . . or 
they may vote to replace incumbent board members”). 
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reactive remedy51—implies that shareholders are powerless to take 
prophylactic measures. To the contrary, enabling such ex ante protection 
against mismanagement appears to be the central purpose of § 109. 
At the same time, bylaws must respect, per the “not inconsistent 
with law” language of § 109(b),52 the fundamental command of § 141(a) 
that the firm’s “business and affairs . . . shall be managed . . . by or 
under the direction of a board of directors.” Fortunately, these two 
provisions can be reconciled more easily than the “recursive loop”53 
argument suggests.54 Section 141(a), by its own terms, is a general grant 
of managerial authority to the board; so long as bylaws do not challenge 
that general grant, they can be consistent with § 141(a) regardless of 
what issues they address. To be sure, a bylaw could easily encroach on 
the board’s authority if it imposes on it particular managerial decisions, 
either directly (i.e. bylaws of the form “the board must do X”) or 
indirectly (i.e. bylaws of the form “the board must not do A, B, C, etc.” 
so that the only practicable choice remaining would be X). However, if 
an individual bylaw seeks to protect against mismanagement by 
identifying a single policy that it prohibits the board from implementing, 
leaving the board with virtually unlimited alternatives, it is hard to see 
how that in anyway threatens the statutory command of § 141(a). 
To say that the board has broad managerial discretion is to say that 
it has a very large set of possible decisions at its disposal.55 At the same 
                                                                                                                 
 51. In theory, it is possible for shareholders to anticipate that the business strategy 
of the board will have unhappy results, and thus remove the board proactively. In 
practice, the board is very rarely removed until the firm has performed quite poorly. See 
generally BEBCHUK & FRIED, infra note 99. 
 52. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 109. 
 53. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a). 
 54. See generally Gordon, supra note 1 and accompanying text. 
 55. Indeed, unless the board’s power is constrained by the certificate of authority, 
there are few lawful actions that the board cannot approve. It can donate corporate 
assets to charity. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 122(9) (“Every corporation . . . shall have 
power to [m]ake donations for the public welfare or for charitable, scientific or 
educational purposes . . . .”); Theodora Holding Corp. v. Henderson, 257 A.2d 398 
(Del. Ch. 1969) (holding that § 122 authorizes any charitable donations so long as they 
are “reasonable”). Boards commonly give money away to private individuals—namely, 
former executives—in what Bebchuk and Fried call “gratuitous goodbye payments.” 
See Lucian A. Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, Symposium on Bebchuck & Fried’s Pay 
without Performance: Overview of the Issues, 30 IOWA J. CORP. L. 637, 663 (2005) 
(describing the prevalence of severance payments not required by the executive’s 
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time, § 109(b) permits the bylaws to remove large sets of options from 
consideration by the directors—i.e. options that constitute the forms of 
grievous mismanagement against which § 109(b) protects. The bylaw-
enacted invalidation of certain types of decisions by the board leaves the 
board with nearly unlimited discretion, and more or less as expansive as 
if there were no bylaws at all. Moreover, in practice the shareholders 
will enact but a handful of bylaws. If the bylaws are circumscribing in 
nature, their effect on managerial discretion would be infinitesimal. 
B. WHAT IS A CIRCUMSCRIBING BYLAW? 
Section A described and derived the central tenet of BG:56 Bylaws 
are valid and enforceable so long as they merely circumscribe the 
board’s discretion, without attempting to control or bind it. Parts II and 
III of this Article evaluate the consistency of this hypothesis with 
Delaware case law, and section C of this Part will offer a normative 
defense of BG. Before moving onto either of these topics, it will be 
useful to more precisely define what it means for a bylaw to be 
circumscribing, and to consider some concrete examples. 
A bylaw is circumscribing if it prohibits the board from 
implementing certain specified policies without reducing its overall 
discretion.57 Bylaws that are not circumscribing can be said to be 
controlling, in that they force the board, de jure or de facto, to adopt a 
particular policy. Built into these concepts is a type of substance-over-
                                                                                                                 
compensation contract, which are granted to the executive after it has become clear that 
the executive’s employment will be terminated). 
 56. It should be noted that this Article does not at all address federal securities law. 
Many circumscribing bylaws of the sort that I contend are enforceable under Delaware 
law might be excludable from the company’s proxy statement under Rule 14a-8. That 
rule, for instance, permits the company to exclude proposals “deal[ing] with a matter 
relating to the company’s ordinary business operations.” 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (2011). 
Quite simply, proxy access and bylaw enforceability are distinct issues, even if they are 
somewhat co-dependent in practice. 
 57. This distinction between circumscribing bylaws and controlling bylaws to 
some degree resembles one of Professor Coffee’s hypothetical tests for bylaw 
validity—one that he characterized as “affirmative orders versus negative constraints.” 
See Coffee, supra note 34, at 614. However, it is not clear just what Coffee had in 
mind. He mentioned this distinction only in passing, without any explanation of what it 
meant, how it could operate as a legal rule, or how it was consistent with the statutory 
text. He wrote that that the “case law seems clearest” in establishing this as a test of 
bylaw validity, but no case citations. Id. Nor did he characterize the difference between 
affirmative orders and negative constraints as an empirical question. Id. at 608-09. 
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form analysis not unlike the one applied in CA.58 To determine whether 
a bylaw was in fact circumscribing, a court would look not to the 
wording or the logical structure of the proposed bylaw restriction, but 
rather to the actual quantity and variety of options that would remain 
open to the board when the bylaw is implemented.59 Thus, 
characterizing a bylaw as circumscribing is a fact-bound, if not precise, 
process. 
It is important to be careful about defining what exactly constitutes 
the board’s discretion. The number of options theoretically available to a 
board of directors at any given time is nearly unlimited; if they were all 
considered to be valid substitutes or alternatives for each other, then 
even highly intrusive shareholder interference could be characterized as 
circumscribing. For instance, consider the argument of an investor who 
wants to characterize as circumscribing a bylaw prohibiting an 
automaker from investing in any manufacturing facility that draws 
power from a carbon-burning electric plant: millions of options would 
still remain! The company could build in areas with an abundance of 
wind power, launch (or acquire) a consulting business, invest in solar 
energy, pay dividends instead of re-investing in the company, outsource 
its manufacturing, etc. To accept this argument would grant 
shareholders a veto power over nearly any substantive decision of the 
firm, because those options (or equivalent ones) are always available. 
The key concept for assessing whether a bylaw circumscribes or 
controls is substitutability. What matters is not the number of options 
theoretically retained by the board, but the number that are reasonably 
substitutable for the policy that the bylaw purports to take away. This 
inquiry should be framed by the legitimate purpose of the decision or 
                                                                                                                 
 58. See CA, Inc. v. AFSCME Emps. Pension Plan, 953 A.2d 227, 236 (Del. 2008) 
(“But the Bylaw’s wording, although relevant, is not dispositive of whether or not it is 
process-related. The Bylaw could easily have been worded differently, to emphasize its 
process, as distinguished from its mandatory payment, component.”). 
 59. A hypothetical example illustrates the point. Suppose a company is considering 
ten possible locations for siting a manufacturing facility: five in Mexico, four in Costa 
Rica and one in Malaysia. If a shareholder proposes a bylaw that says “the company 
shall not locate a manufacturing plant within 3000 miles of the United States border,” in 
form, that is circumscribing. In reality, such a proposal would be functionally 
equivalent to a binding bylaw requiring the facility to be sited in Malaysia. In such 
cases, courts will look behind the formal structure to the underlying reality. 
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policy prohibited by the bylaw.60 To use the automaker example above, 
the investor’s argument would fail because a consulting business is not a 
reasonable substitute for an automobile plant; the value propositions of 
these two investments implicate completely different economic and 
organizational concerns.61 Or to take an example from finance, issuing 
equity is, in practice, rarely a reasonable substitute for issuing debt.62 
Thus, a bylaw prohibiting new debt issuance would not be 
circumscribing, but a bylaw prohibiting the issuance of certain types of 
debt (e.g., debt with ultra-short maturity) might be. Of course, 
shareholders would not invest energy passing bylaws about ordinary 
business matters such as the term structure of debt,63—unless it was 
something particularly dangerous, such as an overreliance on overnight 
                                                                                                                 
 60. By “legitimate” purpose, I am referring only to the purposes that would be 
accepted under the business judgment rule. Just as a director would not fare well in 
court if she defended her decision as the best means to entrench herself in office, the 
circumscribing nature of a bylaw would not be measured by whether the board retained 
alternatives as useful for self-dealing or shirking. I am not intending to invoke any 
strongly normative concept, such as the “legitimate business purpose” standard 
articulated in Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, 353 N.E.2d 657, 663 (1976). 
 61. For instance, a board might have an economic forecast in which demand for 
automobiles increases, which would make the automobile plant an attractive 
investment. It would say nothing in particular about demand for consulting—let alone 
debt collection services, railroad transport or even automobile financing. It would be 
outrageous to suggest that the board needs to consider all possible investments before 
making its decision, or even attempt to find the globally optimal investment. Likewise, 
boards will naturally take account of the manageability of the investment. For instance, 
an auto company will find it much easier to manage a new auto plant than a non-auto 
related investment. These two factors are just illustrations of the many ways in which 
different types of investments would not be considered to be reasonable substitutes. 
 62. Typically, firms issue equity only when they are unable to finance their capital 
needs from internal earnings or through debt. This is because the use of equity 
financing sends a signal—intended or not—to the market that management thinks 
poorly of the firm’s future prospects. Hence firms will find it cheaper to finance out of 
internal earnings first, then to issue debt, and to issue equity only as a last resort. For 
description of this “pecking order” theory of finance and some citations to empirical 
evidence supporting it, see Robert P. Bartlett III, Taking Finance Seriously: How Debt 
Financing Distorts Bidding Outcomes in Corporate Takeovers, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 
1975, 1988 (2008). 
 63. Note that this would not be true of non-circumscribing bylaws. An investor 
who foresees a future rise in interest rates might try to compel the board to issue only 
long-maturity debt. This could be achieved by means of a controlling bylaw, but not 
with a circumscribing one. 
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repo borrowing rendering vulnerable to sudden illiquidity.64 In such 
cases, a shareholder intervention may be greatly desirable. 
To illustrate the concept, consider the following potentially useful 
circumscribing bylaws, some of which will be discussed later in the 
Article: 
 
 A Real Say On Pay: This type of bylaw would permit 
shareholders to prohibit particular compensation practices, 
although not necessarily the overall amount. For instance, a 
bylaw might prohibit repricing of option grants, or require 
the strike prices of granted options to be indexed to broader 
market indices. Such bylaws would differ from the “say on 
pay” provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act65 in two important 
respects. First, they would have legal force, as opposed to 
being merely advisory.66 Second, they would not give 
shareholders a say over the entire compensation package, 
but merely some input over the form that compensation will 
take. Such bylaws would be circumscribing because they 
would permit the board great latitude in setting the amount 
of compensation and its form; only certain compensation 
measures would be taken off the table. 
 
 No First Vote: This type of bylaw would prevent the board 
from issuing shares of stock in a private placement without 
a restriction preventing the shares from being voted in the 
first annual and/or special meeting following their 
issuance.67 The purpose here would be to prevent managers 
                                                                                                                 
 64. This type of overreliance triggered the collapse of Bear Stearns and Lehman 
Brothers. When counterparties chose not to lend against the repo collateral, Bear and 
Lehman could not satisfy a huge balance of immediately due liabilities, since they were 
holding mostly non-salable assets. See Brian J.M. Quinn, The Failure of Private 
Ordering and the Financial Crisis of 2008, 5 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 549, 594 (2009). As it 
turns out, most of those non-salable assets also turned out to be non-valuable, but in 
theory both firms could have failed simply by virtue of the mismatched term structure 
of their assets and liabilities. 
 65. Pub. L. No. 111-203 (July 21, 2010) (hereinafter “Dodd-Frank”). 
 66. Id. Dodd-Frank § 951 (providing that shareholder resolutions on compensation 
“shall not be binding on the issuer or the board of directors of an issuer”). 
 67. Weaker forms of this bylaw might be more narrowly tailored to the bylaw’s 
purpose at the expense of somewhat less protection of shareholders’ interests. For 
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from stacking the deck in a close vote by issuing large 
blocks of equity to allied third parties expected to vote in 
favor of the managers’ position.68 It would be 
circumscribing because it permits the company to raise 
capital by practically any means imaginable, including 
equity issuance.69 
 
 Director or Officer Term Limits: These speak for 
themselves. They can prevent entrenchment,70 and promote 
a level of director turnover sufficient to prevent the board 
from becoming complacent or ineffective.71 Such limits 
would be circumscribing because they permit the board to 
choose nominees to the board from an almost unlimited 
pool of applicants, just not the directors whose terms have 
expired. 
 
 No Reappointment of Removed Directors: Boards of 
directors sometimes reappoint directors who have been 
                                                                                                                 
instance, the restriction on the newly issued shares could last only 90 days, or perhaps a 
separate shareholder vote would be required for it to have effect. 
 68. See, e.g., Frantz Mfg. Co. v. EAC Holdings, Inc., 501 A.2d 401, 403-04 (Del. 
1985) (describing a plan by a board of directors to dilute the holdings of an adverse 
controlling shareholder by issuing stock to the company’s Stock Ownership Program, 
administered by the board). 
 69. Indeed, it would be unlikely that new investors who are not white knights 
would place a high value on a single shareholder vote. At the very most, the company 
might have to accept a slightly lower price for the equity shares. If the company was 
actually unable to issue equity on these terms, then the bylaw might cease to be 
circumscribing in fact. 
 70. Term limits have been endorsed for this reason even by Martin Lipton, the 
supposed entrencher of “me-first managers” and “apologist for embattled chief 
executives who don’t like shareholders sounding off on excessive pay and cozy 
boards.” See Lipton & Lorsch, supra note 18, at 68; for the unflattering 
characterization, see Gretchen Morgensen, Memo to Shareholders: Shut Up, N.Y. 
TIMES, Feb. 11, 2007 at D1. 
 71. It is worth noting that from 2005 to 2008, the majority of the independent 
directors of Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers had served on the boards for more than 
a decade, and disproportionately likely to be octogenarians. Some commentators have 
opined that companies would be better served with somewhat younger directors. See, 
e.g., Marc Goldstein, Mitigating Dysfunctional Deference Through Improvements in 
Board Composition and Board Effectiveness, 103 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 490, 497 
(2009) (urging investors to weigh the benefits of “expertise and free time” against those 
of “youth and diversity”). 
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voted out of office.72 This quite obviously undermines the 
efficacy of shareholder democracy. To be sure, the 
reappointment decision is frequently motivated by good 
reasons—for instance, the director might have expertise 
rendering her service indispensable—but shareholders have 
a good reason to prohibit this practice: their vote should 
have a sting, so that directors are motivated to perform well. 
As with the issue of term limits, the circumscribing nature 
of this bylaw is obvious; it merely prevents the appointment 
of a small number of individuals out of the entire universe 
of qualified people. 
 
The primary claim of this Article is that BG describes existing 
Delaware law, because the Delaware courts will enforce circumscribing 
bylaws as defined here. But before demonstrating that claim in the case 
law, it will be useful to inquire why shareholders would want to be able 
to promulgate circumscribing bylaws. By definition, they have a 
somewhat limited effect and permit the directors to retain ample 
discretion. In what ways are they useful? Would shareholders want more 
than circumscribing power? How would circumscribing bylaws affect 
the efficiency of corporate governance? These questions are addressed 
in the next section. 
C. THE NORMATIVE CASE FOR BG 
BG, like all theories of corporate governance, addresses a 
fundamental policy question: how can corporations operate efficiently 
when they are run by directors and officers who do not bear the costs of 
the decisions they make? As Berle and Means long ago observed, 
modern businesses consume capital so prodigiously that their operations 
can be financed only by aggregating the resources of a large number of 
                                                                                                                 
 72. See, e.g., Airgas, Inc. v. Air Prods. & Chems., Inc., No. 5817-CC, 2010 Del. 
Ch. LEXIS 206, at *18 (Del. Ch. Oct. 8, 2010) (noting that, in response to a proxy 
contest that removed a director from the board, the Airgas board added a new seat and 
reappointed the removed director); U.S. Surgical Corp. v. Circon Corp., No. 15223, 
1997 Del. Ch. LEXIS 161, at *4 (Del. Ch. Sept 17, 1997) (describing an announcement 
made by a company in its proxy statement that it would consider reappointing a director 
if the shareholders voted him out of office). 
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investors, most commonly on a foundation of publicly owned equity.73 
Professor Bainbridge, among many others, has reminded us that such a 
dispersed ownership base cannot manage an enterprise.74 Perhaps more 
importantly, investors by and large do not want to.75 The task must be 
delegated to dedicated professionals, and this, of course, creates an 
incentive for those professional managers to shirk.76 While investors 
seek to minimize shirking (more precisely, the agency costs of 
shirking77), they also want to respect the managers’ autonomy; after all, 
the managers were hired in the first place because investors lack enough 
information to intelligently make (or evaluate) business decisions. 
Thus, the delicate task of corporate governance is to reduce agency 
costs while preserving sufficient independence for managers to make the 
decisions needed to maximize the value of the firm.78 By this measure, 
                                                                                                                 
 73. See Adolf A. Berle, Jr. & Gardiner C. Means, The Modern Corporation and 
Private Property 6 (1932). Today, publicly-traded stock is common but not necessary. 
The “public” can indirectly own equity stakes in companies by means of intermediaries 
such as private equity, hedge or mutual funds. Companies controlled by private equity 
funds are considered closely held from a legal and operational point of view, though the 
economic benefits of that equity ownership may be widely dispersed. 
 74. See Bainbridge, supra note 18, at 557 (describing the problems inherent in 
decision-making structures characterized by dispersed authority). 
 75. See Eugene F. Fama & Michael C. Jensen, Separation of Ownership and 
Control, 26 J.L. & ECON. 301, 301-02 (1983) (arguing that corporations benefit from 
the separation of ownership and control because it can take advantage of the 
specialization of labor, hiring professional managers with deep expertise in their field). 
 76. On the definition of shirking as used in this article, see supra note 8. 
 77. Quite obviously, investors care about the impact of shirking on the bottom line, 
not the metaphysical question of “how much” shirking is going on. The cost of shirking 
is typically referred to as an agency cost, by analogy to the loss that a principal suffers 
when the agent does not faithfully follow instructions. See, e.g., Robert H. Sitkoff, The 
Economic Structure Of Fiduciary Law, 91 B.U. L. REV. 1039, 1042 (2011) (“The losses 
and other inefficiencies resulting from the misalignment of the principal’s and the 
agent’s interests are called agency costs.”). Note that this terminology does not imply 
that the directors or managers should be regarded as agents of shareholders. See, e.g., 
Lynn A. Stout, The Mythical Benefits Of Shareholder Control, 93 VA. L. REV. 789, 791 
(2007) (describing the incidence of agency costs in an article denying the validity of the 
principal/agent model of corporations). 
 78. This formulation is intended to be as consistent with as many theories of the 
firm as possible. The vast majority of corporate scholars would agree that reducing 
agency costs and maximizing the value of the firm are both desirable ends, all else 
being equal. I leave open the possibility that these goals are not fully compatible, which 
is to say that value might be maximized when agency costs are greater than the 
minimum achievable level. See, e.g., Stout, supra note 77, at 790 (arguing that 
shareholders benefit from board governance despite its high agency costs, because it 
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BG can outperform the two governance paradigms that have received 
the most attention and advocacy from scholars in recent years. The 
“director primacy” (“DP”) view of corporate governance asserts that 
corporations run most efficiently when managerial authority is 
centralized in the board of directors as much as possible.79 Adherents of 
this view expect the board both to closely monitor the officers to make 
sure they are not shirking, and to fend off demands from the 
shareholders for near term profits that might come at the expense of 
long-term success.80 By contrast, the “shareholder empowerment” view 
contemplates an active role for shareholders in the management of the 
corporation, permitting them to decide a number of fundamental issues, 
such as when the corporation should liquidate, distribute its earnings, 
sell itself to a bidder, or where it should incorporate.81 This view, most 
closely identified with Professor Bebchuk, profoundly distrusts the 
directors’ ability and/or inclination to act in the best interests of the 
shareholders, and calls attention to structural biases in board decision-
making that result in inefficiently lavish compensation for managers and 
job security for the directors and officers alike.82 
1. BG vs. Director Primacy 
When comparing BG with DP, it should be noted at the outset that 
BG only mildly deviates from DP’s central descriptive and normative 
                                                                                                                 
“also promotes efficient and informed decision-making” among other more-than-
offsetting benefits). If that were the case, I believe most scholars would prioritize value 
maximization. Real disagreement exists, however, as to whether the maximized value 
should be that of the shareholders’ equity or a broader measure of economic value. 
Compare Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 18, at 439-40 (arguing that the proper 
role of the corporate board and management is to maximize shareholder wealth), with 
Kent Greenfield, Defending Stakeholder Governance, 58 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1043 
(2008) (arguing that the concerns of all the firm’s investors, including “employees, 
communities [and] creditors,” should be “brought into the governance of the firm”). My 
intention is to be agnostic on these issues. 
 79. See, e,g., Bainbridge, supra note 18 (expounding his view on the importance of 
director primacy). 
 80. See, e.g., Lipton & Savitt, supra note 11, at 745-46, 750-51 (describing how a 
strong board of directors can protect against “short-termism” in corporate management 
and protect the firm from “runaway agency costs”). 
 81. See Lucian Ayre Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, 118 
HARV. L. REV. 833, 836-37 (2005). 
 82. See BEBCHUK & FRIED, infra note 99, at 1-15. 
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contention that the management of the corporation is best left to the 
board. The difference is that BG recognizes the validity and usefulness 
of circumscribing bylaws. However, bylaws will always be far less 
numerous than managerial decisions, so the differences between the two 
systems would be situated mostly at the margins. One might describe 
BG as a director primacy system with an attached bylaw feature. Thus, 
comparing the two paradigms is mostly a matter of understanding the 
value of the bylaw option. 
The central advantage of BG is its ability to reduce agency costs 
over what DP can achieve. To see this, consider a commonly used 
method for controlling shirking by managers: equity compensation.83 
When executives are stockholders, they certainly have more incentive to 
increase the value of the corporation’s shares,84 but this effect wears out 
well before the point of value optimization.85 Moreover, incentive 
alignment is rarely effective against the pursuit of private rewards, 
because managers will enjoy all of their benefits, but bear only a pro 
rata share of the costs.86 Equity ownership by executives can 
                                                                                                                 
 83. See, e.g., Robert J. Jackson, Jr., Stock Unloading and Banker Incentives, 112 
COLUM. L. REV. 951, 953 (2012) (discussing use of equity compensation to reduce 
agency costs). As explained above, supra note 78, one need not believe that directors or 
managers are agents to accept that analogy for purposes of defining and diagnosing 
agency costs. 
 84. Since the financial crisis of 2008, scholars have paid more attention to a nasty 
side effect of equity compensation—namely, its encouragement of excessively risk-
seeking behavior on the part of managers. See, e.g., Simone M. Sepe, Making Sense of 
Executive Compensation, 36 DEL. J. CORP. L. 189, 192 (2011). This is a real problem 
and I would not minimize its significance. However, it only reinforces the point being 
made in this section—that structural approaches have important limitations, and 
discussing it at length simply introduces needless complication. 
 85. This is a simple matter of the declining marginal utility of labor and wealth. 
Assuming managers rationally pursue the easiest money first, the effect of increasing 
their price-maximizing effort—either by working harder or by increasingly focusing on 
increasing share price (as opposed to, for instance, their own job security)—decreases 
as the level of that effort increases. At the same time, the managers are getting wealthier 
as the share price increases, and thus the utility they derive from additional increases in 
stock price also declines. At some point, the executives will decline to increase their 
effort and/or faithfulness because it will not be worth it for them—even though it would 
still be valuable for shareholders. 
 86. To be sure, sophisticated equity compensation systems that rely on derivative 
instruments (such as deep out of the money options) might be able to increase the 
sensitivity of the executives’ portfolio to small valuation changes resulting from 
shirking. See Bebchuk & Fried, supra note 55, at 665. However, these systems would 
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significantly change their incentives with respect to big decisions. For 
instance, it discourages repeated rejections of premium acquisition 
offers, as that practice can be expected to dramatically reduce the 
company’s share price.87 However, equity ownership is less effective at 
deterring managers from seeking costly perks, as the executives enjoy 
the benefits of their perks privately while spreading the costs across the 
entire shareholder base.88 Board members who hold equity only have an 
incentive to stand firm against managerial rent-seeking that is 
proportional to their typically small stake in the firm.89 A small financial 
incentive can be outweighed by a subjective utility in acquiescing to 
managers’ demands—especially if the directors themselves expect to 
partake of some of the perquisites themselves.90 
Thus, there is no substitute for scrupulous monitoring of the 
executives, by the board and/or the shareholders. Equity holdings 
notwithstanding, managers are likely to give their best stock price-
                                                                                                                 
be very difficult to value and could produce disproportionate windfalls for executives if 
their tenure happens to be successful. 
 87. Bratton and Wachter describe a heterogeneous expectations model for stocks, 
in which the stock prices are seen as “as having two components: first, the fundamental 
value of the stock; and second, the present owner’s option to sell her stock to an even 
more optimistic investor.” Bratton & Wachter, supra note 12, at 707. Since acquirers 
are almost by definition the most optimistic of investors, it is easy to see that under this 
model, a firm’s “just say no” stance to all acquisition offers would decrease the current 
stock price. 
 88. Professors Henderson and Spindler have argued that it is good for companies to 
lavish perks—i.e. private jets, limo service, cheap loans, etc.—on their executives, 
because the executives become addicted to this “corporate heroin.” M. Todd Henderson 
& James C. Spindler, Corporate Heroin: A Defense of Perks, Executive Loans, and 
Conspicuous Consumption, 93 GEO. L.J. 1835, 1878 (2005). The idea is that the 
executives fear of losing these benefits would make them extremely averse to the risk 
of losing their jobs through sub-optimal performance. Id. It’s a clever idea, but not one 
that is useful for practical application. A board seeking to use the “corporate heroin” 
approach would have to determine how much utility their executives subjectively and 
unobservably ascribe to various perks—a task made even more difficult by the 
executives’ incentives to feed disinformation to the board. Id. If the executives can 
convincingly exaggerate their utility and their avarice, they can reap a windfall. 
 89. See id. (describing the ways in which board members share in the perquisites 
typically granted to executives). 
 90. See Lucian Ayre Bebchuk, Jesse M. Fried, & David I. Walker, Managerial 
Power and Rent Extraction in the Design of Executive Compensation, 69 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 751, 754 (2002) (arguing that “executives can receive pay in excess of the level 
that would be optimal for shareholders; this excess pay constitutes rents”). 
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maximizing effort only if they understand they will be punished for not 
doing so. In addition, management can simply make errors, believing in 
good faith in the ultimate success of bad managerial strategies. A good 
corporate governance system provides some mechanism by which these 
mistakes are corrected before they ruin the company.91 
In director primacy systems, it is assumed that the board will 
monitor the executives and the shareholders will monitor the board. 
However, neither form of supervision is fully adequate. Directors have 
their own incentives to shirk, and they do.92 Much recent scholarship has 
been devoted to explaining why independent directors can be expected, 
in theory, to be diligent in monitoring the executives.93 Yet empirical 
studies have shown that the firm valuation is relatively unaffected by the 
                                                                                                                 
 91. While the spectacular flameouts of investment banks like Bear Stearns and 
Lehman Brothers deservedly grab the headlines, companies can be damaged by poor 
managerial decisions more subtly and gradually over time. Consider the example of 
Holland Furnace Company, the business at the center of the famous greenmail case 
Cheff v. Mathes, 199 A.2d 548 (Del. 1964). Holland’s business was selling home 
furnaces door-to-door. Id. at 550. The firm’s management was so proud of this business 
model that it took extraordinary measures—with the active support of the board—to 
fend off a takeover effort by an entrepreneur who thought that furnaces could be more 
efficiently sold at a retail or department store. Id. at 552-53. Had the board taken its job 
more seriously, it might have noticed that the company’s stock traded on the market for 
less than half its book value. Id. This sure signal that investors expected the company to 
lose money in the near future was ignored, and to nobody’s surprise, the door-to-door 
furnace company soon went out of business. Id. 
 92. To cite one of many examples, board shirking played an important role in the 
collapse of MF Global. Not long after the firm acquired a huge portfolio of risky 
sovereign debt that led to its collapse, its chief risk officer, Michael Roseman, alerted 
the board to the extent of the firm’s downside exposure. See Ben Protess & Azam 
Ahmed, Lax Oversight Blamed in Demise of MF Global, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 3, 2012, at 
B6. Instead of investigating the situation—which would have brought the board into 
some conflict with the firm’s CEO, Jon Corzine—the board simply looked for a new 
chief risk officer. Id. Roseman resigned, and the board hired someone who, in the 
words of one U.S. Congressman, “would tell Mr. Corzine what he wanted to hear.” Id. 
(quoting Representative William J. Posey of Florida). 
 93. See, e.g., Fisch, supra note 18, at 281-83 (arguing that independent directors 
lack motivation to permit managers to destroy shareholder value, as they will not 
personally benefit); Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Rise of Independent Directors in the United 
States, 1950-2005: Of Shareholder Value and Stock Market Prices, 59 STAN. L. REV. 
1465, 1563 (2009) (arguing that when corporations try to maximize shareholder value 
and stock market prices are informative, “independent directors are more valuable than 
insiders”). 
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percentage of the board comprised of independent directors.94 This is 
hardly a shocking discovery. Directors get paid no matter how much 
time they devote to their tasks and the consequences to them of failure 
are minimal.95 Thus, boards too often fail to exercise sufficient diligence 
to protect against manager-induced catastrophic failure.96 Director 
independence may help reduce the power of CEOs to some degree,97 but 
often the directors are not given the resources necessary to adequately 
monitor the executives.98 On compensation-related matters, even 
independent boards simply do not implement effective strategies. For 
                                                                                                                 
 94. See Gordon, supra note 93, at 1468 (noting the “lack of correlation between the 
presence of independent directors and the firm’s economic performance” and that 
“studies have searched in vain for an economically significant effect on the overall 
performance of the firm”); P.M. Vasudev, Default Swaps and Director Oversight: 
Lessons from AIG, 35 J. CORP. L. 757, 782-83 (2010) (observing that the board of AIG 
was dominated by independent directors in the years before its collapse). 
 95. The business judgment rule usually protects directors from liability, and, in 
addition, they enjoy liability insurance purchased for them by the company. See Steven 
M. Davidoff, Ex-Directors of Failed Firms Have Little to Fear, DEALBOOK - N.Y. 
TIMES (Aug. 2, 2011), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/08/02/ex-directors-of-failed-
firms-have-little-to-fear/. While it has been claimed that directors fear the harm to 
reputation that comes from presiding over a corporate collapse, recent evidence 
suggests that their careers are minimally impacted, if at all. Id. 
 96. For instance, the nominally independent boards at Lehman Brothers and Bear 
Stearns were largely dysfunctional before those firms’ collapse. At Lehman, most of the 
policy was made by the executive committee comprised of CEO Richard Fuld and John 
C. Macomber—an ex-CEO who was retired for twenty years and who had no 
background in financial services. The risk committee met only twice in 2007. Bear 
Stearns did not even have a risk committee until March 2007—only a year before its 
collapse and probably well after it had purchased enough bad debt that insolvency was 
inevitable. See generally, Richard Lieberman, Corporate Governance Lessons From 
The 2008 Financial Crisis: Assessing The Effectiveness Of Corporate Governance 
Through A Look At Troubled Companies, 64 CONSUMER FIN. L. Q. REP. 425, 427 
(2010). 
 97. See Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, Embattled CEOs, 88 TEX. L. REV. 987, 
989 (2010) (arguing that CEOs “are losing power to boards of directors that 
increasingly consist of both nominally and substantively independent directors”). 
 98. See, e.g., Nicola Faith Sharpet, The Cosmetic Independence of Corporate 
Boards, 34 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1435, 1435 (2011) (arguing that outside directors may 
appear to be independent, when in fact they do not have the resources to be 
“substantively independent”); Anita Anand, Frank Milne, & Lynnette Purda, 
Monitoring to Reduce Agency Costs: Examining the Behavior of Independent and Non-
Independent Boards, 33 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 809, 814 (2010) (presenting evidence that 
independent and non-independent boards act similarly, and thus there is little 
performance difference in the respective firms). 
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instance, they grant stock options at the money and do not award 
compensation that is sensitive to underlying firm performance.99 To the 
extent that managers might be motivated to perform better out of fear of 
being ousted, generous severance packages can mitigate that 
motivation.100 
Shareholders may fare no better in monitoring directors; they have 
only blunt instruments at their disposal and therefore can discipline only 
very poorly performing boards. To punish a director requires removing 
her from office, which in turn requires the selection of a replacement. In 
so doing, shareholders can choose only between retaining incumbent 
directors and replacing them with a rival slate that usually has no track 
record of managing the firm in question and whose performance 
generally cannot be predicted.101 Assuming that the performance of the 
company has, on the whole, been acceptable—perhaps it would be better 
with reduced agency costs, but possibly worse with strategic or 
operational mismanagement—replacement of the incumbent is risky. 
The shareholders cannot mix the operational skills of one board and 
combine them with the faithfulness of another; they must choose one 
option or the other.102 This “bundling problem” presents itself to any 
democratic polity with limited voting options.103 Managers and 
                                                                                                                 
 99. See LUCIAN BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE (2004). As 
the authors point out, at-the-money option grants are inefficient incentives. Id. They 
permit executives to reap large financial rewards from a rising stock market, even if the 
managers’ performance has been quite poor in relative terms. When options lose value 
because of market conditions, the strike price is often reset. Bebchuk and Fried 
advocate the indexing of equity grants to market and industry performance, a 
suggestion that remains largely unfollowed. 
 100. See Bebchuk & Fried, supra note 55, at 666-76. 
 101. This is often referred to as the bundling problem, which Professor Bebchuk has 
identified as a principal justification for shareholder empowerment. See Bebchuk, supra 
note 81, at 857-64. 
 102. The shareholders can, of course, elect boards consisting of directors with 
different areas of expertise. A board might have a compensation expert, an operations 
expert, a finance expert, and so forth. There is little if any evidence, though, that these 
“teams of experts” inherit the best qualities of their individual members. 
 103. See, e.g., NELSON W. POLSBY & AARON WILDAVSKY, PRESIDENTIAL 
ELECTIONS 292 (7th ed. 1988) (“It is possible for candidates to get 100 percent of the 
votes and still have every voter opposed to most of their policies, as well as having 
every one of their policies opposed by most of the voters.”); see also Peter Shane, 
Political Accountability in a System of Checks and Balances: The Case of Presidential 
Rulemaking, 48 ARK. L. REV. 161, 213 (1994); Cynthia R. Farina, Against Simple Rules 
for a Complex World, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 987, 998 (1997). But see K.A.D. Camara, 
Shareholder Voting and the Bundling Problem in Corporate Law, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 
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directors, aware of this problem, realize that they may extract rents 
without effective punishment so long as the overall performance 
remains solid. 
At this point, it is evident why circumscribing bylaws might be 
useful: they permit shareholders to corral the worst excesses of 
management directly and correct the board’s egregious failures without 
having to replace a majority of the directors. However, such bylaws 
cannot force the board to implement any particular policy. In theory, the 
shareholders could do this for any and all decisions of the board, but in 
practice bylaws would be used sparingly, at most. Circumscribing 
bylaws are purely defensive in nature, and cannot be used by 
shareholders to impose their will on the board. Bylaws are also costly to 
enact, therefore shareholders would only have an incentive to use them 
against the type of highly inefficient policies that we might normally 
characterize as abuses of power. Could shareholders use a series of 
circumscribing bylaws to consistently remand board decisions in an 
attempt to “wear down” the board and force it to acquiesce to their 
demands? Such circumstances are plausible, but the chances of them 
actually occurring are infinitesimal. After all, directors are more nimble 
than shareholders; the former can act with a single meeting, whereas the 
latter must laboriously collect consents or proxies from a majority of the 
outstanding shareholders.104 The board usually wins wars of attrition.105 
                                                                                                                 
1425, 1429 (2004) (arguing, based on a rational-signaling model, that the bundling 
problem is “largely illusory”). 
 104. To be sure, a small group of shareholders that together own a majority stake in 
the company can move quickly, as they have but a small number of written consents to 
obtain. In that case, however, they would not need to act via bylaw; they could simply 
replace individual directors one by one, via that same written consent process, until the 
board capitulated. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 228(a) (providing that “any action 
which may be taken at any annual or special meeting of such stockholders, may be 
taken without a meeting, without prior notice and without a vote, if a consent or 
consents in writing . . . shall be signed by the holders of outstanding stock having not 
less than the minimum number of votes” required to take the action.); DEL. CODE ANN. 
tit. 8, § 141(k) (providing that “[a]ny director or the entire board of directors may be 
removed, with or without cause, by the holders of a majority of the shares”). If the 
board is classified, then directors may not be removed individually without cause, see 
id., so the process by which the majority bloc exerted its will on the board might be 
more complex. Still, acting via circumscribing bylaw would be an inefficient way or 
doing so. 
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It may be asked why BG should stop at circumscribing bylaws. If 
shareholders can control agency costs more effectively than the board, 
then why not permit them to force the board toward the policy with the 
lowest agency cost, instead of simply steering the board away from high 
agency cost policies? Indeed, some scholars have suggested just such a 
corporate governance paradigm, which can be described rather faithfully 
as a “shareholder empowerment” approach. This is the subject of the 
next subsection. 
2. BG vs. Shareholder Empowerment 
The central distinction between BG and “shareholder 
empowerment” (“ShEmp”) is that the former countenances only 
circumscribing bylaws, and the latter advocates for direct shareholder 
control over corporate policy, whether via bylaws or expanded voting 
rights over substantive issues. Shareholder empowerment has been a 
debate largely framed by Professor Bebchuk’s seminal article “The Case 
For Increasing Shareholder Power.”106 There, Bebchuk proposed to re-
allocate to shareholders decision-making power on issues such as 
amending the charter, choosing a state of incorporation, scaling down 
the corporate enterprise through asset sales and/or distributions, and 
selling or dissolving the company. 
For the same reasons that BG can reduce agency costs further than 
systems of director primacy, it is likely that ShEmp could reduce them 
even further. However, this governance paradigm comes with at least 
one substantial drawback: empowered shareholders can badly disrupt 
decision-making within the firm. While shareholders might occasionally 
have incentive to intentionally harm the company,107 more frequently 
their participation would be procedurally burdensome and would 
interfere with management’s expert decision-making.108 Indeed, 
                                                                                                                 
 105. Cf. Air Prods. & Chems., Inc. v. Airgas, Inc., 16 A.3d 48, 55-56 (Del. Ch. 
2011) (noting that Air Products had been attempting to acquire Airgas for 16 months, 
but gave up because the fight had become too expensive). 
 106. Bebchuk, supra note 81. 
 107. Shareholders who have used derivative securities to take a net short position in 
the firm would have an incentive to cause it harm. See Henry T. C. Hu & Bernard 
Black, The New Vote Buying: Empty Voting and Hidden (Morphable) Ownership, 79 S. 
CAL. L. REV. 811, 815 (2006). 
 108. See, e.g., Bratton & Wachter, supra note 12, at 658-59 (noting that corporate 
law “has always privileged the directors and their appointed managers [over 
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sophisticated organizations cannot operate by referenda. Thus, at a 
minimum, the powers given to shareholders—along with the rules as to 
how and when they can be exercised—must be chosen with great care. 
ShEmp advocates recognize the adverse effects that might stem 
from unchecked investor participation in corporate decision-making, and 
thus have proposed to restrict shareholder input to decisions pertaining 
to the “rules of the game.” 109 Such proposals rest on the optimistic 
assumption that a coherent distinction can be found between decisions 
pertaining to the “rules” and those that occur during the game itself.110 
Moreover, there is little reason to be confident that shareholders’ input 
over rules will be innocuous. It is not hard to imagine opportunistic 
investors using the threat of a dissolution vote to pressure the board to 
make particular business decisions favorable to their interests, beliefs or 
risk preferences.111 The mere threat itself may have force: directors and 
                                                                                                                 
shareholders] in business policymaking because they are better informed than the 
shareholders . . . and best suited to maximize the value of the corporation”). 
 109. See Bebchuk, supra note 81 (advocating shareholder intervention for “rules- 
of-the-game decisions” such as changing the company’s state of incorporation). 
 110. For instance, Bebchuk categorizes two types of decisions rules-of-the-game: 
state of incorporation, and amendments to the corporate charter. Id. But nearly anything 
can be put in the charter. If shareholders want the company to quote prices to customers 
only in Turkish lira, they could put a provision to that extent in the certificate. See DEL. 
CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(1) (stating that the certificate of incorporation may contain 
“[a]ny provision for the management of the business and for the conduct of the affairs 
of the corporation . . . are not contrary to the laws of this State”). Clearly, a distinction 
is needed between those types of certificate provisions that pertain to the rules and 
those that do not; on this point, Bebchuk’s proposals are fuzzy. 
 111. This is far from a hypothetical scenario. Consider, for instance, the efforts by 
Pershing Square Capital—a hedge fund with large holdings in the Target Corporation—
to convince and then cajole the Target board into a plan to spin off all of the company’s 
real estate into a REIT, which would then lease the land back to Target. See Stephanie 
Rosenbloom, Seeing Gold in Target’s Real Estate, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 30, 2008, at B1. 
The board repeatedly refused, in part because the proposal was very risky—meaning 
that it was attractive to hedge fund managers compensated with a 2-and-20 structure, 
but less attractive to other investors. The board’s refusal prompted Pershing Square to 
launch a proxy contest, which it lost. See Zachery Kouwe, Target’s Shareholders 
Strongly Reject Dissident Slate, Ending Divisive Proxy Battle, N.Y. TIMES, May 29, 
2009, at B1. Had Pershing Square been able to threaten the board with rules-of-the-
game changes, the board might have capitulated. 
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executives, after all, are far more dependent on the firm’s continued 
existence than diversified investors.112 
These problems of decisional inefficiencies and shareholder 
opportunism arise because ShEmp inadequately fine-tunes shareholder 
authority. In the ShEmp paradigm, shareholders either have power over 
an issue, which they can wield forcefully, or they do not. By contrast, 
BG regulates the amplitude of shareholder power, permitting it to be 
exercised frequently but with less consequence. Thus, shareholders will 
be largely unable to act opportunistically, because they cannot force the 
board to adopt any particular decision. Likewise, shareholders would 
rarely find it profitable to disturb the company’s decision-making, as 
only very costly (and thus egregiously bad) board policies would be 
worth prohibiting. In other words, shareholders who can merely 
circumscribe will very likely accept the board’s managerial vision, while 
intervening only to reduce agency costs. At the same time, the broad 
reach of shareholder power under BG (but not under ShEmp) means that 
shirking insiders would find it hard to evade the shareholders’ 
proscriptions.113 
The shareholder empowerment paradigm inaptly models corporate 
governance as the allocation of a fixed amount of “power” between the 
board and the equity holders. When Bebchuk writes about “Increasing 
Shareholder Power”114 or when scholars debate the wisdom of giving 
“more power” to shareholders,115 they assume that governance power is 
                                                                                                                 
 112. We can assume that dissolution of the corporate entity would not in fact cause 
the underlying businesses to liquidate, and thus the executives (and to a lesser extent, 
the directors) may be able to continue their employment under different ownership. 
However, managers and directors are typically heavily invested in the firm’s equity, see 
supra notes 83-90 and accompanying text, and thus would stand to suffer a far greater 
injury if the dissolution turns out poorly. 
 113. To see how this might work, suppose there is a CEO named B earning $100M a 
year. ,$100M being extravagant, the shareholders obtain the power—a binding “say on 
pay”—to limit her salary and settle on a sum of $25M a year. In response, B directs the 
company to donate $75M to B’s alma mater, to which B was intending to donate 
anyway. The donation might be in the company’s name, but the school understands the 
identity of the real donor and agrees to name a new library after B. So B gets everything 
she originally wanted, and the shareholders are powerless to stop it because they don’t 
have a “say on donations.” 
 114. See Bebchuk, supra note 81. 
 115. See, e.g., Anabtawi, supra note 9, at 564-65 (arguing that “transferring power 
from boards to shareholders . . . could reduce overall shareholder welfare”); Lynn A. 
Stout, The Shareholder as Ulysses: Some Empirical Evidence on Why Investors in 
Public Corporations Tolerate Board Governance, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 667, 671 (2003) 
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finite and divisible. More power to shareholders means less power for 
directors, and vice versa. This arithmetic concept of governance power 
is mostly metaphorical, and does not account for different configurations 
of governance power. If shareholders were given the right to redeem a 
poison pill by majority vote, but lost the right to be reimbursed for proxy 
contests, has their power “increased” or “decreased”? Does it even make 
sense to ask that question? 
This Article proposes that corporate governance is less about 
quantities of power than it is about the possible outcomes of corporate 
action. The business judgment rule empowers boards to establish goals 
and choose means for implementing those goals from a very large set of 
possible alternatives, all without fear of ex post reprisal by angry 
shareholders. 116 Some of those alternatives are proscribed by corporate 
law—for instance, by fiduciary duties or doctrines governing actions by 
control shareholders—but we do not ordinarily think of such 
proscriptions as neutering the board’s power. Why, then, would it 
compromise the board’s discretion for shareholders to use bylaws to 
further proscribe the board’s set of options, so long as the set remains 
sufficiently large for the board to easily achieve its desired outcomes? 
Such proscriptions will improve corporate governance when their value 
to shareholders exceeds the cost of their imposition upon the board. 
Since circumscribing bylaws, by definition, only minimally impact the 
set of options from which the board can choose, they can improve 
corporate governance—not by “increasing” shareholder power, but by 
improving the quality of the board’s actions. 
II. THE ENFORCEABILITY AND VALIDITY OF CIRCUMSCRIBING 
BYLAWS IN DELAWARE 
The leading bylaw authority in Delaware is the 2008 case CA, Inc. 
v. AFSCME Employees Pension Plan.117 There, the Court analyzed the 
validity under Delaware law of a shareholder-proposed bylaw (the 
“Reimbursement Bylaw”) that purported to require the board of 
                                                                                                                 
(arguing that when investors modify the default rules of corporate governance, “they 
almost always . . . select[] charter provisions that strengthen director control over the 
firm”). 
 116. Cf. Gagliardi v. TriFoods Int’l, Inc. 683 A.2d 1049, 1052-55 (Del. Ch. 1996) 
(describing the business judgment rule as a way of encouraging directors to make risky 
investments that, in aggregate, enrich the shareholders). 
 117. 953 A.2d 227 (Del. 2008). 
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directors to reimburse the proxy expenses of any director who was 
elected to the board while running on a “short slate”—i.e. a candidate 
group numbering less than half the board seats.118 Procedurally, the CA 
case came to the Court via a certification process in which the Court was 
asked to answer two distinct questions. The first was whether the 
Reimbursement Bylaw was a “proper subject” for shareholder bylaws, 
which the Court interpreted as the question of whether the 
Reimbursement Bylaw was within the “scope or reach” of the 
shareholders’ § 109 residual bylaw power.119 The second question 
concerned the interaction between § 109(b) and § 141(a), which as 
discussed above in Part I.A., inheres in every inquiry about the validity 
of any shareholder-enacted bylaw meant to be enforceable against the 
board.120 Together, the two questions form a two-pronged test: Prong 
One requires a bylaw to be within the scope of the bylaw power, and 
Prong Two that it does not interfere with § 141(a). 
The CA opinion failed to articulate coherent principles of bylaw 
validity under either prong. As one of the justices later admitted, the 
Court was rushed by the procedural posture of the case and its approach 
to the case was “not necessarily the best way it could have been 
handled.”121 The problem was not the outcome of the case, but rather 
that the Court’s express reasoning failed to identify and discuss the 
factors that it ultimately found to be dispositive. The Court framed the 
Prong One issue as “whether [the bylaw] is one that establishes or 
regulates a process for substantive director decision-making, or one that 
mandates the decision itself,”122 but its actual Prong One analysis of the 
Reimbursement Bylaw did not turn on process-orientation at all. On 
                                                                                                                 
 118. Id. at 240. Normally, a bylaw is not needed for directors’ proxy contest 
expenses to be reimbursed; directors who win control the board and will vote for 
reimbursement. A short slate, however, does not have voting control, and can obtain 
reimbursement only with approval of potentially hostile incumbent directors. 
 119. Id. at 231. 
 120. Id. at 231. Technically, the question certified was whether the Reimbursement 
Bylaw would cause the Company to “violate any Delaware law.” Id. at 241. However, 
the only law that was even implicated was § 141(a), and that was the law on which the 
Court exclusively focused. Id. 
 121. See Ursaner, supra note 5, at 507-08 (recounting a talk given by Justice Jacobs 
at Harvard Law School, in which he stated that “if we had more than two weeks and 
were not under the pressure of time . . . we might have been able to write [the opinion] 
better,” and admitted that the Court’s approach was not necessarily “the best way it 
could have been handled”). 
 122. CA, Inc., 953 A.2d at 231. 
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Prong Two, the Court relied on far-fetched hypotheticals123 to justify a 
complex and unconvincing explanation of the relationship between the 
shareholder bylaw power and the directors’ fiduciary duties. 
A careful analysis of the opinion shows that the Court was really 
interested in whether proposed bylaws are circumscribing or controlling. 
The two prongs simply reflect two aspects of that inquiry. Section A 
demonstrates that Prong One addresses the bylaw’s purpose—in 
particular, whether that purpose was to circumscribe the board’s 
discretion (in which case it would be a proper subject for shareholder 
action) or to control or bind the board’s discretion (in which case it 
would not). Section B shows that Prong Two deals with the bylaw’s 
actual effect: it serves to invalidate any bylaws that are—whatever their 
purpose—functionally controlling the board. As the Reimbursement 
Bylaw was circumscribing in purpose but controlling in effect, the Court 
upheld it on the first question but invalidated it on the second. 
A. CA PRONG ONE: CIRCUMSCRIBING PURPOSE 
The Court’s response to the first question was troubled from the 
outset. As noted above, it characterized the issue as “whether [the 
bylaw] is one that establishes or regulates a process for substantive 
director decision-making, or one that mandates the decision itself.”124 
This appears to be an attempt at a dichotomous classification, except 
that its purported categories are different in kind and not close to 
exhaustive. Circumscribing bylaws, for instance, are not necessarily 
process-oriented, but they also do not mandate any decision by the 
board. Conversely, it is possible for a bylaw to force a certain policy 
upon the board via regulation of the decision-making process—for 
instance, by requiring unanimous director consent for the company to 
put in place a poison pill when one member of the board is staunchly 
opposed to poison pills in principle.125 Classifying bylaws in this way is 
                                                                                                                 
 123. Id. at 240 n.34. One of the more absurd hypotheticals was that of a competitor 
of a company running a short slate of directors in order to gain access to the firm’s 
sensitive internal information. Even if such a scenario did come to pass, the 
reimbursement of the competitor’s proxy expenses would be a trifle compared with the 
firm’s legal and financial costs. 
 124. Id. at 235 (emphasis added). 
 125. Cf. Frantz Mfg. Co. v. EAC Indus., 501 A.2d 401 (Del. 1985) (upholding a 
unanimous consent bylaw that had the effect of thwarting a substantive decision of the 
board). 
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analogous to dividing peppers into two categories: “spicy” or “green.”126 
The taxonomy is not up to its assigned task. 
Not surprisingly, the language of process and substance also fails to 
accurately describe the case holding. After all, the Court held that the 
Reimbursement Bylaw fell into the “process” category, even though it 
did not even address any decision-making process at all. It was 
apparently enough that the bylaw’s context involved process, and that its 
substantive content addressed a “legitimate” substantive issue, as the 
following excerpt expressly explains: 
The context of the Bylaw at issue here is the process for electing 
directors—a subject in which shareholders of Delaware corporations 
have a legitimate and protected interest. The purpose of the Bylaw is 
to promote the integrity of that electoral process by facilitating the 
nomination of director candidates by stockholders or groups of 
stockholders . . . . The Bylaw would encourage the nomination of 
non-management board candidates by promising reimbursement of 
the nominating stockholders’ proxy expenses if one or more of its 
candidates are elected. In that the shareholders also have a legitimate 
interest, because the Bylaw would facilitate the exercise of their 
right to participate in selecting the contestants.127 
It is not hard to see that the Court never really engaged the concept 
of process-orientation here. If bylaw validity turns on the legitimacy of 
shareholder interests, then whether it regulates process is not a 
dispositive factor. Nor should it be. For instance, a bylaw that required 
the board to consult with shareholders before making any significant 
business decision would be purely process-oriented, and yet one doubts 
that the Court would consider that to be within the scope of bylaws.128 
Moreover, the proffered distinction between process regulation and 
substantive mandates would contravene a rarely-discussed clause of the 
text of § 109(b). That section in full states that the “bylaws may contain 
any provision . . . relating to the business of the corporation, the conduct 
of its affairs, and its rights or powers or the rights or powers of its 
                                                                                                                 
 126. Of course, peppers can be both green and spicy, whereas red bell peppers are 
neither. 
 127. CA, Inc. v. AFSCME Emps. Pension Plan, 953 A.2d 227, 237 (Del. 2008) 
(emphasis added). 
 128. This “consultation bylaw” could only fail—as it must—under CA prong one. 
Prong two focuses on the bylaw’s consistency with law. There is no statute in the 
DGCL that would be violated by a requirement that the board listen to shareholders 
before making a decision. Section 141(a) would be satisfied, since the board would still 
make the decision, and thus would manage the firm’s business and affairs. 
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stockholders, directors, officers or employees;”129 similarly, § 142(a) 
commands that “the titles and duties” of the corporation’s officers are 
specified by the bylaws.130 These provisions simply cannot be reconciled 
with a rule that restricts bylaws to the establishment or regulation of 
decision-making processes. Employees have no defined corporate 
governance function or any default rights, so to the extent that a bylaw 
“relates” to their “rights or powers,” it must do so by expanding or 
abridging employees’ rights created by the board. Neither option is 
process-oriented. A bylaw that defines the duties of the officers would 
undoubtedly have a process dimension, since it would specify who 
makes certain decisions. But one would be hard pressed to argue that it 
would be only process-oriented; after all, if a bylaw confers upon the 
corporate secretary the duty of taking attendance at board meetings, that 
would seem to commit the board to the substantive policy of taking 
attendance, which it might not want to do. 
The Court’s confusion lies entirely in the first of the two proposed 
categories. The second category—bylaws that “mandate the decision 
itself”—simply refers to controlling bylaws. Logic thus suggests that the 
first category really consists of circumscribing bylaws; then we would 
have a dichotomy between controlling and circumscribing bylaws that is 
both complete and coherent.131 This, in turn, explains the Court’s 
approval of the Reimbursement Bylaw’s purpose. It did not seek to force 
a particular policy on the board, but only to establish a threat of removal 
sufficiently credible132 to encourage the board to engage shareholders’ 
concerns.133 Whether it remained fully true to that purpose was a 
question reserved (and answered in the negative) for Prong Two. 
A trace of this controlling/circumscribing logic is clearly visible in 
the Court’s emphasis on the shareholders’ “legitimate and protected” 
                                                                                                                 
 129. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 109. 
 130. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 142(a) (“Every corporation organized under this 
chapter shall have such officers with such titles and duties as shall be stated in the 
bylaws . . . .”). 
 131. That is, all bylaws can be characterized as controlling or circumscribing, since 
the latter is defined as the absence of the former, and by the same token, no bylaw can 
fall into both categories. 
 132. For reasons discussed supra note 101 and accompanying text, removal of the 
entire board is often not an attractive option for shareholders. 
 133. The Reimbursement Bylaw did ultimately fail as a circumscribing bylaw for 
reasons discussed below in Part II.B. However, the purpose of establishing a credible 
threat of director removal is circumscribing. 
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interest. In Delaware, promoting the integrity of the electoral process 
has long meant something more than protecting the casting of ballots—it 
has occasioned substantive restrictions on the behavior of the board.134 
For instance, directors may not intentionally interfere with the outcome 
of a shareholder vote, at least on matters pertaining to the election 
of directors, unless they can provide a compelling justification for doing 
so.135 Nor can they buy votes or similarly use corporate funds to induce 
shareholders to support their election. 136 These doctrines cannot be 
characterized as either process-oriented or substantive: they at once 
regulate electoral procedures and shape the powers and duties of the 
board, via circumscription rather than control. The democracy-
promoting rule of Blasius, for instance, requires nothing of the board; it 
merely invalidates a limited subset of possible board responses to a 
hostile bid—namely intentional interference with a shareholder vote.137 
By contrast, shareholder attempts to use Blasius to curtail the board’s 
discretion have been rebuffed.138 
It is also notable that the Court so heavily emphasized that the 
shareholders’ bylaw power is no mere default rule. Twice it observed 
that, per the express language of §109(b), the bylaw power cannot be 
eliminated or even narrowed by the certificate of incorporation;139 and 
then added an additional footnote “to reiterate” the salience of the 
relevant statutory language.140 As argued above in Part I.A., the 
inalienability of the bylaw power strongly indicates that it was intended 
                                                                                                                 
 134. See supra note 127 and accompanying text. 
 135. See MM Co. v. Liquid Audio, Inc. 813 A.2d 1118, 1131 (Del. 2003) 
(upholding the Blasius rule that the board may not “act with the primary purpose . . . of 
impeding . . . the franchise” unless it can present a “compelling justification” for doing 
so). 
 136. See, e.g., Portnoy v. Cryo-Cell Int’l, 940 A.2d 43, 73-74 (Del. Ch. 2008) 
(holding that “the use of a corporate asset . . . by the management slate to secure a vote 
for itself” is a breach of fiduciary duty); Schreiber v. Carney, 447 A.2d 17 (Del. Ch. 
1982) (subjecting vote buying transactions to a rigorous test of entire fairness). Of 
course, the board may use corporate money to persuade shareholders to vote for them. 
The line between advocacy and purchase is a thin one that has not yet been resolved. 
 137. Blasius Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 659 (Del. Ch. 1988). 
 138. See, e.g., Stroud v. Grace, 606 A.2d 75 (Del. 1992) (holding that Blasius does 
not restrict the board’s power to reject unqualified nominees to the board, even if 
replacement nominees are not permitted). 
 139. CA, Inc. v. AFSCME Emps. Pension Plan, 953 A.2d 227, 231 (Del. 2008); for 
the statutory text, see supra note 28 and accompanying text. 
 140. CA, Inc., 953 A.3d at 234 n.13. 
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to protect an important interest.141 It is hard to believe that the Court 
would so heavily emphasize that the bylaw power cannot be curtailed if 
it really conceived of bylaws as trivial lists of logistical procedures. It 
clearly contemplated a more significant principle,142 even if it could not 
precisely articulate what it had in mind. 
Other bylaw cases also support the distinction between 
circumscribing and controlling, as well as make clear that the operative 
principle of bylaw validity applies outside the narrow context of 
electoral procedures. For instance, in Frantz Manufacturing. Co. v. EAC 
Industries143 incumbent management was attempting to issue equity to 
an entity it controlled so as to wrest control away from an investor that 
had newly acquired a majority share of the company’s stock.144 In a 
response approved by the Court, the new controlling shareholder 
amended the bylaws to block this action.145 In Airgas, Inc. v. Air 
Products, Inc.,146 the shareholders attempted to give themselves a not-
entirely-illusory ability to vote in favor of a hostile tender offer and thus 
circumvent the board’s de facto insuperable defense of “just saying 
never.”147 This circumscribing bylaw was ultimately invalidated, but not 
                                                                                                                 
 141. See text accompanying notes 36-48. 
 142. CA, Inc., 953 A.3d at 234. To be sure, the inalienability of the bylaw power 
does not, in itself, offer any rule of decision, nor did the Court imply that it could. See 
id. at 234 (noting that the language of § 109(b) is “only marginally helpful in 
determining what the Delaware legislature intended to be the lawful scope of the 
shareholders’ power to adopt, amend and repeal bylaws”). 
 143. 501 A.2d 401 (Del. 1985). 
 144. Id. at 407. 
 145. See id. (noting that “the bylaw amendments were a permissible part of EAC’s 
attempt to avoid its disenfranchisement as a majority shareholder”). In this case, the 
shareholder already had one seat on the board, and so it could achieve a veto over any 
disenfranchisement by means of an arguably procedural bylaw that prohibited the board 
from acting without unanimous consent of all members. 
 146. 8 A.3d 1182 (2010). 
 147. Id. at 1187. The bylaw would have moved an annual meeting of Airgas to a 
date in January, only four months after the prior year’s annual meeting at which a third 
of the incumbent directors were replaced. Id. The purpose of the bylaw was to hasten a 
vote to replace another third (and create a majority on the board in favor of the 
acquisition by Air Products) before Air Products would be forced to withdraw its offer. 
Id. at 1187-88. Without such accelerated voting, hostile bids are hopeless: the defense 
mechanism of a poison pill plus a classified board has never been defeated. As the 
Chancery Court held in a subsequent opinion, “just saying never” is beyond the 
legitimate power of the board. See Air Prods. & Chems., Inc. v. Airgas, Inc., 16 A.3d 
48, 127-29 (Del. Ch. 2011). 
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because it exceeded the shareholders’ authority; it merely contradicted 
an explicit charter provision, and presumably would have been valid 
under a different charter.148 In short, bylaws have been found to fall 
within the scope of § 109(b) when their purpose is to prevent the board’s 
from defeating legitimate shareholder interests—regardless of whether 
the bylaws are process-oriented or pertain to elections. 
It is instructive to examine Frantz in more detail. In that case, the 
board attempted to issue equity to an entity it controlled in order to 
dilute the voting power of a shareholder who had just obtained a 
controlling stake.149 The shareholder amended the bylaws to require 
unanimous consent among directors for any corporate action—a strategy 
that was effective in blocking the equity issuance, because the newly 
controlling shareholder had already been seated and could veto that 
action.150 Thus, the shareholder was protected by a “procedural” bylaw. 
Suppose, by contrast, that the shareholder had not yet been seated on the 
board. Does the corporate law really prevent such an investor from using 
a bylaw to prevent the board from diluting his or her voting power?151 It 
                                                                                                                 
 148. Airgas, Inc., 8 A.3d at 1186-87. To be specific, the corporate charter provided 
that a given class of directors would serve until the “annual meeting of stockholders to 
be held in the third year following the year of their election.” Id. at 1188. In practice 
this had always meant that directors served three-year terms, and the Court found the 
provision to be ambiguous as to whether the directors’ terms could be shortened by 
moving the date of the annual meeting. Id. Because charters are in the nature of a 
contract, the court used methods of contract interpretation to determine the intent of the 
drafting parties, which was to establish three-year terms. Id. at 1190. Hence a bylaw 
shortening the tenure of one class to 28 months (see supra note 147) conflicted with the 
certificate and was therefore invalid. Airgas, Inc., 8 A.3d at 1188-93. Importantly, the 
Court’s reasoning relied exclusively on the law of contract interpretation. Id. at 1190-
92. Nowhere in the opinion does the Court exhibit any doubt that the bylaw was a 
proper exercise of the § 109(b) power. Id. at 1188-93. Had the certificate clearly 
indicated that the directors’ terms lasted only until the annual meeting date—for 
instance, if the certificate stated that directors were ‘elected to hold office for a term of 
variable length expiring on the date of the third annual meeting after their election,’—
the bylaw would have been valid. Id. 
 149. Frantz Mfg. Co. v. EAC Indus., 501 A.2d 401, 402 (Del. 1985). 
 150. Id. at 402-03. 
 151. A shareholder diluted in this way would likely sue the board for breach of duty. 
Whether that suit would be effective, though, is highly uncertain. The closest case on 
point—Benihana of Tokyo v. Benihana, 906 A.2d 114 (Del. 2006)—would cut against 
a challenge to the equity issuance. There, the board issued new equity in such a way as 
to destroy the majority control held by the plaintiff-shareholder, and with it any real 
threat to the board’s job security. Id. at 116-17. The trial court had found that the board 
did not act with an entrenching purpose, even though two board members had discussed 
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seems more likely that the Court would approve a bylaw functionally 
equivalent to the Frantz procedural trick—for instance, something 
similar to the No First Vote bylaw described above, which prevents 
newly issued equity from voting in the first meeting after issuance152—
without regard to its “substantive” nature. 
Indeed, No First Vote fits very comfortably within the explanation 
given in CA for why the Reimbursement Bylaw was within the scope of 
the § 109(b) power. To again recite that language: 
The context of the Bylaw at issue here is the process for electing 
directors—a subject in which shareholders of Delaware corporations 
have a legitimate and protected interest. The purpose of the Bylaw is 
to promote the integrity of that electoral process by facilitating the 
nomination of director candidates by stockholders or groups of 
stockholders. 153 
Each of the last two sentences applies easily to No First Vote, and 
arguably with greater force than to the Reimbursement Bylaw. Surely a 
majority shareholder has an even more legitimate and protected interest 
in removing (by proxy vote) directors who would try to deprive it of its 
majority stake. Similarly, it would promote the integrity of the electoral 
process to prevent management from tipping the outcome by issuing 
new equity to an entity it controls (or a friendly third party) just in 
advance of the election.154 In other words, No First Vote satisfies the 
                                                                                                                 
issuing equity for just such a purpose but a few months before. Id. at 121-22. The Court 
accepted these conclusions, again without questioning the board’s motives. Id. The 
point here is not that Benihana was incorrectly decided, but rather a much simpler 
point: majority shareholders can not really count on the courts to protect their majority 
stake against dilutive actions by a hostile board. 
 152. See supra note 67 and accompanying text. 
 153. CA, Inc. v. AFSCME Emps. Pension Plan, 953 A.2d 227, 237 (Del. 2008). 
Recall also the statement that concluded the previous paragraph in that opinion: 
“[w]hether or not a bylaw is process-related must necessarily be determined in light of 
its context and purpose.” Id. at 236-37. 
 154. Cf. Portnoy v. Cryo-Cell Int’l, 940 A.2d 43 (Del. Ch. 2008). In this case, the 
incumbent board, in response to a proxy contest it was losing, the board conferred 
company assets—in that case, a second seat on the board—to shareholders who 
purchased shares in the open market and voted for the incumbent slate. Id. at *46-48. 
The Chancery Court invalidated this vote-buying arrangement. Id. While Portnoy does 
not express the issuance of new equity, it is not a long throw from rewarding a 
shareholder with a board seat for buying shares, and selling newly issued equity to a 
white knight. 
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articulated standard—or the closest thing to a standard that the Delaware 
courts have issued—for bylaw validity under Prong One, though it is not 
a process-oriented provision. It does so because it barely imposes on the 
board’s discretion. By any measure, it simply offers to all majority 
shareholders the anti-dilution protection fortuitously (at least in part) 
available to the Frantz shareholder by virtue of being seated before the 
other board members initiated their mischief. 
Here another advantage of BG becomes apparent: it permits 
shareholders to protect themselves ex ante, rather than relying on 
expensive litigation to seek protection from the courts. The board’s anti-
dilution efforts in Frantz were bound to fail. The Frantz court strongly 
implied that it would have upheld the majority shareholder’s rights if, 
lacking a bylaw in its favor, it had run to court alleging impermissible 
entrenchment.155 The remedy would have been in equity under the 
venerable rule of Schnell v. Chris-Craft Industries, Inc. that “inequitable 
action does not become permissible simply because it is legally 
possible.”156 If this were going to be the outcome, then why not permit 
the shareholder to use the mechanism that leads to the lowest transaction 
costs? Judicial resolution of the issue is expensive; bylaw resolution 
would be cheap, as soon as Delaware articulates an express, coherent 
standard for bylaw validity. 
B. CA PRONG TWO: CIRCUMSCRIBING EFFECT 
The test of Prong One—whether the proposed bylaw is a “proper 
subject” for bylaws by virtue of circumscribing purpose—is merely the 
first half of the overall question of bylaw validity. Section 109(b) also 
requires that bylaws cannot be “inconsistent with law or the certificate 
of incorporation.” The “law” that cannot be contravened includes the 
delegation of managerial authority to the board of directors under § 
141(a)—which is to say that bylaws can be invalid simply by too deeply 
infringing upon managerial duties and prerogatives.157 In fact, before 
                                                                                                                 
 155. Of course, Frantz was decided many years before the unfavorable precedent of 
Benihana, discussed supra note 151. Thus, the landscape is murkier now. To be sure, a 
diluted majority shareholder would not be without favorable precedent, but more 
certain protection for the investor’s property right would be better. 
 156. 285 A.2d 437, 439 (Del. 1971). 
 157. See, e.g., Quickturn Design Sys. v. Shapiro, 721 A.2d 1281, 1291 (Del. 1998) 
(invalidating provision that would “impermissibly deprive any newly elected board of 
both its statutory authority to manage the corporation under 8 Del. C. § 141(a) and its 
concomitant fiduciary duty pursuant to that statutory mandate”). 
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CA, this limitation on bylaw validity was almost the exclusive focus of 
academic commentary.158 In light of the lack of clear guidance from the 
courts, commentators were left either to attempt to extract a bit of 
sustenance from the barren statutory edifice,159 and/or to speculate about 
where the corporate law would (or should) draw the line between 
permissible and impermissible infringements upon managerial 
prerogatives.160 Fortunately, courtesy of CA, we now have the benefit of 
explicit guidance from the Court, though it requires careful scrutiny. 
This guidance tells us that the theory of inconsistency in Prong Two 
merely extends the “scope or reach” inquiry, testing whether a bylaw 
intended to be circumscribing actually operates as such.   
As noted previously, the question addressed in CA was the validity 
of a controlling bylaw that required the board to reimburse certain proxy 
contest expenses. The Court was concerned that the command of the 
bylaws would force the board to act contrary to its fiduciary duties. In 
particular, it would require reimbursements that no board could possibly 
authorize in good faith, such as when “the proxy contest is motivated by 
personal or petty concerns, or promote[s] interests that do not further, or 
are adverse to, those of the corporation.”161 
The Court’s focus on the action-forcing nature of the 
Reimbursement Bylaw was so complete that it seemed unable to provide 
another reasonable example of how the bylaw’s command would 
interfere with the board’s fiduciary duties. It offered the far-fetched162 
hypothetical of a competitor running a director slate in order to gain 
                                                                                                                 
 158. See, e.g., John C. Coates IV & Bradley Faris, supra note 1, at 1329-30 (arguing 
that the § 141(a) prohibition on measures that restrict the board’s exercise of fiduciary 
duties “bodes ill” for the prospective validity of bylaws); id. at 1329 n.28 (listing 
articles that analyze the validity of bylaws under § 141(a)). 
 159. See, e.g., Brent H. McDonnell, supra note 10 (attempting to find a general 
pattern in the statutory provisions that specifically authorize bylaw resolution of certain 
topics); Gordon, supra note 1, at 546 (noting that sections 109(b) and 141(a) form a 
“recursive loop” in which each section confers power on the board or the bylaws except 
as provided by the other, thus permitting any division of authority between bylaws and 
the board to be consistent with the statutes). 
 160. See, e.g., Coffee, supra note 34, at 614. 
 161. CA, Inc. v. AFSCME Emps. Pension Plan, 953 A.2d 227, 240 (Del. 2008). 
 162. See Ursaner, supra note 5, at 546. The fact that the Court had to rely on such a 
far-fetched hypothetical also suggests that it went too far in declaring the bylaw to be 
facially invalid. Id. It could just as easily have upheld the bylaw as valid on its face, and 
potentially invalid as applied to any situation where it might have required directors to 
breach their fiduciary duties. 
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access to the confidential information that comes with board 
representation.163 Surely this scenario borders on the absurd: it is 
inconceivable that a competitor could ever be successful in such an 
endeavor, and if it somehow pulled it off, the reimbursement of its proxy 
expenses would be far from the most pressing concern of either the 
company or the corporate law.164 The use of such a hypothetical 
suggests that the Court did not want to imply invalidity for any bylaw 
that did not mandate reimbursement. If it had so intended, it could 
simply have reasoned that (1) the board exercises its business judgment 
over proxy reimbursement, and thus (2) it could deny reimbursement for 
any reason it deemed appropriate. No absurd fact patterns would be 
required—only a simple explanation that bylaws cannot have any 
constraining effect on the board’s decision making. The fact that it 
eschewed that simple reasoning strongly suggests that it was articulating 
a distinction between (invalid) controlling bylaws and (presumably 
valid) circumscribing ones. 
More support for this interpretation comes from the Court’s 
analogy of the Reimbursement Bylaw to “contractual arrangements that 
commit the board of directors to a course of action that would preclude 
them from fully discharging their fiduciary duties.”165 As this language 
indicates, these contractual arrangements tend to be controlling 
restrictions; in cases like Paramount,166 Omnicare,167 and Capital Re,168 
boards had tried to bind themselves to merger transactions,169 much as 
                                                                                                                 
 163. CA, Inc., 953 A.2d at 240 n.34. 
 164. If it were even remotely possible for shareholders to elect such “Manchurian 
candidates” to the board, one might wonder if the shareholder franchise is worth the 
“assiduous” protection it currently receives. See MM Cos. v. Liquid Audio, Inc., 813 
A.2d 1118, 1127 (Del. 2003). One might also suspect that the courts would be able to 
prevent such directors from being seated. As the Delaware courts note from time to 
time, “inequitable action does not become permissible simply because it is legally 
possible.” See, e.g., Hollinger Int’l v. Black, 844 A.2d 1022, 1078 (Del. Ch. 2004) 
(citing Schnell v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 285 A.2d 437, 439 (Del. 1971)). In other 
words, multiple systems would have to suffer complete failure before the situation the 
Court hypothesizes could even arise. 
 165. CA, Inc., 953 A.2d at 238 (emphasis added). 
 166. Paramount Commc’ns Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34 (Del. 1994). 
 167. Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, Inc., 818 A.2d 914 (Del. 2003). 
 168. ACE Ltd. v. Capital Re Corp., 747 A.2d 95 (Del. Ch. 1999). 
 169. In each case, the acquiring company forced the target to finalize the merger by 
making it legally impossible for the target to accept another offer. In Paramount, the 
merger agreement contained a “no shop” provision prohibiting the target from 
discussing any third party bid unless it was unsolicited and fully financed; in Capital 
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the Reimbursement Bylaw tried to bind the board to a certain type of 
financial transaction. As those controlling restrictions were invalid, so 
too would be controlling bylaws. 
Unfortunately, there’s a catch that must be explained. The CA 
Court also analogized the Reimbursement Bylaw to the slow-hand 
poison pill, a seemingly circumscribing limitation on board power that 
was invalidated in Quickturn.170 The slow-hand pill prohibited the board 
from redeeming the pill during the six-month period following a change 
of control in the company,171 but otherwise left the board completely 
free to engage in any other type of strategic business transaction.172 Its 
purpose was to protect existing directors (who, by refusing to redeem 
the company’s poison pill, were thwarting an acquisition attempt) from 
being removed from office in a proxy contest sponsored by a frustrated 
hostile bidder.173 While a slow-hand pill would not offer ironclad 
protection,174 the delay would further lengthen the acquisition process, 
increase its cost, and thus discourage takeover bids. 
If Quickturn really intended to apply broadly to any circumscribing 
self-disablement of board power (and if CA really intended to extend the 
analogy between the slow-hand pill and the Reimbursement Bylaw that 
far), then BG argument would be in some danger. But two critical and 
distinctive features of the slow-hand pill explain Quickturn’s holding, 
and counsel strongly in favor of a narrow reading of that case. First, the 
                                                                                                                 
Re, the merger agreement permitted the target to entertain other bids only if outside 
counsel opined that the board’s fiduciary duties so required; and in Omnicare, the target 
was required to put the merger agreement to the shareholders’ vote, the majority of 
which had already been committed in favor of the merger. Each target board was 
effectively bound, with no real ability to pursue any other course of action. 
 170. Quickturn Design Sys., Inc. v. Shapiro, 721 A.2d 1281, 1291-92 (Del. 1998). 
 171. See id. at 1287-88. Technically, it only prohibits the pill from being redeemed 
in order to facilitate a transaction with the person who sponsored the proxy context. If a 
new bidder emerged, the board could redeem the pill to permit that transaction to 
proceed. 
 172. Id. at 1291-92. 
 173. Id. at 1283. 
 174. The protection was less than total because the bidder could still elect new 
directors who, after six months, would presumably redeem the pill. But as Air Products 
discovered in its attempted hostile takeover of Airgas, bidder-nominated directors do 
not always do the bidder’s bidding. See Air Products, Inc. v. Airgas, Inc., 16 A.3d 48, 
89 (Del. Ch. 2011) (noting that the three directors nominated by Air Products and 
elected in a subsequent proxy contest voted with the incumbent board members to reject 
Air Products’ offer and to maintain Airgas’ poison pill). 
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slow-hand pill relied on a contract with shareholders to restrict the 
board’s authority to redeem it.175 That is, it embedded the slow-hand 
feature into the contractual terms of the shareholder “rights” distributed 
to shareholders in the poison pill.176 It would have been simpler for the 
board to bind itself with a bylaw or resolution requiring a six-month 
wait before redemption, but any such provision could be reversed by the 
bidder’s board after a successful proxy contest. Hence, the slow-hand 
feature had to be embedded in a contract that the new directors could not 
unilaterally alter. Only then would it have any meaningful deterrent 
effect. 
Functionally speaking, then, the slow-hand pill was an effort by the 
board of directors to manufacture for itself a power specifically denied 
to it by the corporate law. Not only does the DGCL not provide any 
means for a board to bind itself, but a line of precedent dating back 
almost a century holds unambiguously that directors may not 
contractually burden their vote as directors, either to each other, to the 
shareholders or to a third party.177 The slow-hand pill purported to avoid 
this problem by permitting the board to use the corporation’s contract 
power as an almost perfect substitute for the vote-binding power denied 
to individual directors. Thus, in invalidating the slow-hand pill, the 
Court correctly invoked § 141(a)—i.e. the original grant of power to the 
board.178 In doing so, the Court focused on a slightly different facet of 
                                                                                                                 
 175. See Quickturn, 721 A.2d at 1292. 
 176. A poison pill consists of a set of warrants distributed via dividend to 
shareholders that permit the shareholders to purchase of a large number of stock shares 
at a discount price in the event that any person or group of people acquires a large block 
of stock. The blockholder, however, is not permitted to exercise this option. As a result, 
when other shareholders exercise their options, the new blockholder will be diluted at a 
steep financial loss. The warrants distributed as part of the pill contain a number of 
contractual terms, including a provision for redemption by the board—and, in the case 
of the slow-hand pill, a slow-hand feature. For a detailed description of a poison pill, 
see Moran v. Household International, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346, 1352-61 (Del. 1985). 
 177. See, e.g., Abercrombie v. Davies, 123 A.2d 893, 899 (Del. Ch. 1956), rev’d on 
other grounds, 130 A.2d 338 (Del. 1957) (holding that “this Court cannot give legal 
sanction to agreements which have the effect of removing from directors in a very 
substantial way their duty to use their own best judgment on management matters”); 
Chapin v. Benwood Foundation, 402 A.2d 1205, 1206, 1211 (Del. Ch. 1979) 
(invalidating an attempt by a board to “legally bind itself in advance to name designated 
persons to fill vacancies on the board of trustees as such vacancies occur” because 
directors may not alienate their duty to use their best business judgment); cf. McQuade 
v. Stoneham, 263 N.Y. 323, 331 (1934) (prohibiting directors from agreeing ex ante to 
retain the services of a corporate officer). 
 178. See Quickturn, 721 A.2d at 1291-92. 
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the slow-hand chicanery: that the pill attempted to limit the board’s 
power by directorial fiat, when the law clearly requires that any such 
limitations be set forth in the certificate.179 But the fundamental 
deficiency is the same no matter what specific theory is invoked: the 
slow-hand pill attempted to arrogate to the board a power it did not 
have. 
It follows, then, that Quickturn has little direct bearing on the 
validity of shareholder-approved bylaws. The bylaws, after all, are 
passed pursuant to § 109(b), which expressly authorizes the shareholders 
to do what the board cannot: contravene the business judgment of the 
board on some matters. The central issue in bylaw validity is not 
whether the board’s discretion can be circumscribed, but rather the 
extent to which it can be circumscribed.180 To put the issue differently, 
the § 141(a) limiting provision undergirding Quickturn thrusts in a 
different direction from the limiting provision of § 109(b). The former 
countenances any substantive reduction of the board’s discretion, but 
requires a specific and relatively demanding procedure to be followed—
i.e. certificate amendment. Section 109(b), by contrast, says nothing of 
procedure, but countenances a much narrower set of restrictions on the 
board. That Quickturn found a procedural deficiency in the board’s 
disablement does not imply anything about whether a bylaw would 
impermissibly encroach on the board’s powers. 
Why, then, did the CA court cite to Quickturn and analogize the 
bylaw to the slow-hand pill? The Court appeared to be focusing on an 
important common feature of the slow-hand pill and the bylaw: both 
tightly constrained the board’s discretion over matters to which they 
applied. Indeed, the whole passage from the opinion reads: 
Quickturn involved [a] binding contractual arrangement[] that the 
board of directors had voluntarily imposed upon themselves. This 
case involves a binding bylaw that the shareholders seek to impose 
involuntarily on the directors in the specific area of election expense 
                                                                                                                 
 179. See id. at 1291 (holding that “[s]ection 141(a) requires that any limitation on 
the board’s authority be set out in the certificate of incorporation”). 
 180. To reiterate, if bylaws cannot circumscribe the board’s discretion at all, then 
they would have no legal effect. They would be functionally equivalent to shareholder 
resolutions. See, e.g., Hollinger Int’l, Inc. v. Black, 844 A.2d 1022, 1080 (Del. Ch. 
2004). Such a legal characterization would make a mockery of legislature’s decision to 
make the bylaw power inviolable. In any event, the DGCL specifically authorizes 
bylaws to circumscribe the board’s direction in many provisions, and the courts have 
held that the board’s power can be limited by valid bylaws. Id. at 1077-80. 
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reimbursement. Although this case is distinguishable in that respect, 
the distinction is one without a difference. The reason is that the 
internal governance contract—which here takes the form of a 
bylaw—is one that would also prevent the directors from exercising 
their full managerial power in circumstances where their fiduciary 
duties would otherwise require them to deny reimbursement to a 
dissident slate.181 
Crucially, the Court here relies on the mandatory nature of the 
reimbursement bylaw, and specifically that it requires the board to act a 
certain way independent of the factual context.182 As the Court explains, 
the distinction between contractual binding and bylaw binding is 
“without a difference” because in both cases, the directors retain no 
discretion to exercise any business judgment.183 
Here the Court invokes the second feature of the slow-hand pill that 
should render Quickturn inapplicable to circumscribing bylaws: the 
slow-hand pill may have been circumscribing in form, but it was 
controlling in substance. That the slow-hand pill excessively constrained 
the board’s discretion was made amply clear in Quickturn itself: 
This Court has held ‘to the extent that a contract, or a provision 
thereof, purports to require a board to act or not act in such a fashion 
as to limit the exercise of fiduciary duties, it is invalid and 
unenforceable.’ . . . . 184 
The Delayed Redemption Provision would prevent a new Quickturn 
board of directors from . . . redeeming the Rights Plan to facilitate a 
transaction that would serve the stockholders’ best interests, even 
under circumstances where the board would be required to do so 
because of its fiduciary duty.185 
The Court did not use the “require” language carelessly. Generally 
speaking, a hostile bidder that goes so far as to mount a proxy contest 
will be the only party interested in paying full value for the target 
company.186 Thus, in most hostile bids, the only options are ‘no sale’ or 
                                                                                                                 
 181. CA, Inc. v. AFSCME Emps. Pension Plan, 953 A.2d 227, 239 (Del. 2008) 
(emphasis added). 
 182. Id. at 239. 
 183. Id. 
 184. Quickturn, 721 A.2d at 1292 (emphasis added). 
 185. Id. at 1292-93 (emphasis added). 
 186. It is always possible that a new bidder could emerge with a superior bid. In 
such a case, however, the slow-hand feature would bind the board’s discretion in a 
different way entirely; the board would be unable to conduct an auction contest between 
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‘sale to the hostile bidder.’ By taking the latter off the table, the slow-
hand pill would have effectively bound the directors to the ‘no sale’ 
option—even if their fiduciary duties would have required them to 
complete the transaction. 
A true circumscribing bylaw, by contrast, permits the board to 
pursue a variety of strategies not only in theory, but in fact as well. 
Thus, neither of the factors on which Quickturn turned—the use of 
contracts to invent a procedure for the board to bind itself and the 
heavily binding nature of the restriction itself—would be applicable. 
The relevance of Quickturn to circumscribing bylaw rests in its 
demonstration that the Court will pursue a substance-over-form analysis 
in analyzing restrictions on board power. Indeed, this same point was 
made in the CA scope or reach analysis, where the Court wrote: 
Because the Bylaw is couched as a command to reimburse (“The 
board of directors shall cause the corporation to reimburse a 
stockholder”), it lends itself to CA’s criticism. But the Bylaw’s 
wording, although relevant, is not dispositive of whether or not it is 
process-related. The Bylaw could easily have been worded 
differently, to emphasize its process, as distinguished from its 
mandatory payment, component. By saying this we do not mean to 
suggest that this Bylaw’s reimbursement component can be 
ignored.187 
In short, the effect of a provision cannot be determined from its 
face. 
One loose end still remains: the phrase “full managerial power” in 
the excerpt cited above.188 When the Court explained the invalidity of 
the Reimbursement Bylaw as a matter of preventing “the directors from 
exercising their full managerial power in circumstances where their 
fiduciary duties would otherwise require them” to act differently, did 
the Court mean to imply that all of the board’s once-extant powers must 
remain permanently available?189 It likely did not; if that was in fact the 
                                                                                                                 
the two bidders, as its ability to close a transaction with the first bidder would be 
disabled. See Gordon, supra note 1, at 533-34. Furthermore, since the new bid is a 
superior offer, the board would likely breach its Revlon duties by rejecting it. Thus, the 
slow-hand feature would bind the board a single course of action: accepting the new bid 
on the terms initially proposed. 
 187. CA, Inc. v. AFSCME Emps. Pension Plan, 953 A.2d 227, 236 (Del. 2008). 
 188. See supra note 181 and accompanying text. 
 189. See supra note 181. 
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law, a company could, for instance, never commit to specific 
performance in a contract, as doing so would require directors to 
alienate their power to efficiently breach. Furthermore, the words “full 
power” do not normally imply that an actor possesses all theoretically 
available powers, but rather only those powers needed to do something 
in particular. Indeed, in the last forty years, the Delaware Supreme Court 
has used the phrase “full power” in fifteen other cases;190 in every single 
one, it described someone having the “full power . . . to” achieve some 
end.191 In many of those cases, the Court was referring to a board 
delegating its “full power” to a committee of the board, in which cases 
the “full power” being delegated was necessarily less than the absolute 
sum of the board’s powers.192 In short, the phrase “full managerial 
power” is subject to an implied qualifier, without which it lacks an 
ascertainable meaning. 
The most logical reading is that “full managerial power” implies 
the need for a substance-over-form analysis, designed to make sure that 
the board retains its discretion in fact, and not just in form. The “full 
power” formulation originated in Quickturn, where the Court explained 
that the slow-hand pill was invalid because it “prevents a newly elected 
board of directors from completely discharging its fiduciary duties to 
protect fully the interests” of the company and its shareholders.193 This 
less opaque passage reveals the issues about which the Court was 
principally concerned. Recall that the slow-hand pill purported to permit 
the board to freely exercise its discretion in all respects other than 
redeeming the pill. But the Court considered that discretion illusory, 
taking away the most important power (pill redemption) without 
                                                                                                                 
 190. I am examining the Court’s usage, and thus not including cases where the 
phrase “full power” only appeared in a quoted document. 
 191. See, e.g., Beam ex rel. Martha Stewart Living Omnimedia, Inc. v. Stewart, 845 
A.2d 1040, 1055 (Del. 2004) (describing how a special litigation committee often “is 
vested with the full power of the board to conduct an extensive investigation) (emphasis 
added); In re Appeal of Infotechnology, Inc., 582 A.2d 215, 221 (Del. 1990) (noting 
that a trial court has “full power to employ the substantive and procedural remedies 
available to properly control the parties and counsel before it”) (emphasis added). 
 192. Some of the powers of the board cannot be delegated to a committee. See DEL. 
CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(c)(2) (2014) (noting that the board may not delegate to a 
committee the power to amend the bylaws or any power “in reference to . . . approving 
or adopting, or recommending to the stockholders, any action or matter . . . expressly 
required . . . to be submitted to stockholders for approval”). 
 193. Quickturn Design Sys., Inc. v. Shapiro, 721 A.2d 1281, 1292 (Del. 1998). 
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providing an effective substitute for permitting a merger to proceed.194 
In other words, the board could not fully protect the shareholders 
because it could not enable them to take advantage of an adequate 
takeover offer—or, put another way, the board would be unable to 
completely discharge its duties because it was “prevent[ed] . . . from . . . 
facilitat[ing] a transaction that would serve the stockholders’ best 
interests, even under circumstances where the board would be required 
to do so.”195 
In other words, the language of “full managerial power” and 
“completely discharging” is fully consistent with the central concept of 
BG. The board’s power may be circumscribed, but only if its ability to 
effectively exercise its business judgment is preserved. As CA noted, 
whether the disablement comes from the board or from the shareholders 
is irrelevant196—what matters is that the board has latitude to pursue its 
ends by reasonably substitutable means. 
C. POST-CA DEVELOPMENTS 
Though CA remains the leading case on bylaw validity, its 
influence may be dwindling. As a formal matter, it has not been 
overturned, modified, or even questioned by any Delaware court. It was 
also notably absent in the most recent bylaw case decided by the 
Delaware Supreme Court: ATP Tour, Inc. v. Deutscher Tennis Bund.197 
Like CA, ATP decided certified questions referred to the Court from a 
federal authority. Unlike CA, ATP said as little as possible. It is a 
minimalist opinion holding that fee-shifting bylaws—i.e. bylaws that 
require plaintiff shareholders to reimburse corporations for costs and 
fees incurred in defending unsuccessful litigation198—are not facially 
                                                                                                                 
 194. See id. at 1291-92 (explaining that while the slow-hand pill “limits the board of 
directors’ authority in only one respect . . . it nonetheless restricts the board’s power in 
an area of fundamental importance to the shareholders—negotiating a possible sale of 
the corporation”). 
 195. Id. at 1292-93. 
 196. See supra note 181 and accompanying text. 
 197. 91 A.3d 554 (Del. 2014). 
 198. Technically, the defendant corporation in ATP was non-stock, and the certified 
question made reference to that technicality. Id. at 557. The Court, however, very 
quickly made clear that the same rules apply to both types of organizations. Id. at 557 
n.10 (“[T]he provisions of the Delaware General Corporation Law, including § 109(b), 
apply to non-stock corporations and all references to the stockholders of a corporation 
are deemed to apply to the members of a non-stock corporation.”). 
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invalid. That is, such bylaws fall within the scope of § 109(b). ATP also 
reminded the federal district court of the long-standing principle that 
bylaws need not be enforced if they were adopted for improper purposes 
or if their enforcement would operate inequitably in a specific case.199 
The opinion did not elaborate upon that basic hornbook rule. 
It is impossible that the Court failed to notice the obvious tension 
between the outcomes in ATP and CA. ATP instructed the district court 
to do precisely what the Court itself did not do in CA: uphold and 
enforce a bylaw despite the possibility that a situation might arise in 
which the bylaw could operate invalidly or inequitably. It is also highly 
unlikely that the Court intended to overrule CA sub silentio. ATP did not 
purport to articulate any new rules of law; much of its analysis simply 
restated the facts and holdings of old cases such as Schnell v. Chris-
Craft Industries and Frantz Manufacturing.200 Moreover, the procedural 
context renders a silent overturning almost unthinkable. The 
certification process exists so that state courts can clarify their law to the 
federal courts that need to apply it; it would make no sense for the 
Delaware Supreme Court to have used this particular occasion to 
confuse everyone else. Until we are given a more explicit statement, we 
must assume that ATP and CA are meant to be consistent. 
The distinction between circumscribing and controlling bylaws 
offers one way of harmonizing the two decisions. The bylaw in ATP did 
not require any action by the board, and thus could not at all 
compromise the directors’ discretion. In fact, the ATP bylaw did not 
even apply to board action at all. The distinction between CA and ATP is 
likely not so simple as the difference between a bylaw that does or does 
not affect the board. As mentioned above, ATP approvingly cited to 
Frantz and Hollinger International v. Black, cases addressing bylaws 
that restricted board action. Of course, one might attribute this 
inconsistency in the case law to outcome-orientation on the part of the 
courts. It would not be unfair to characterize the Delaware courts as 
currently enthusiastic about bylaws that attempt to reduce a company’s 
litigation costs.201 The CA court, by contrast, did not bother to recount 
                                                                                                                 
 199. Id. at 558. 
 200. Id. 
 201. In 2013, the Chancery Court upheld forum-selection bylaws that required 
shareholder derivative suits to be heard in Delaware courts. See Boilermakers Local 154 
Ret. Fund v. Chevron Corp., 73 A.3d 934 (Del. Ch. 2013). As the court approvingly 
explained, such bylaws intend to eliminate the costs to the company of multi-forum 
litigation. Fee-shifting bylaws also attempt to reduce litigation costs, by making the 
litigation more risky for the plaintiffs. 
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any laudable effects that might have resulted from the Reimbursement 
Bylaw. It is hardly implausible that the tension between the cases is the 
product of this enthusiasm gap. This Article, though, takes legal 
reasoning seriously; on that level, the distinction between 
circumscribing and controlling bylaws seems to account well enough for 
the tension between the two cases. 
The interpretation of CA proposed by this Article is also consistent 
with an observation by Vice Chancellor Laster in Klaassen v. Allegro 
Development Corporation.202 In discussing the effect of the board’s 
failure to notice a meeting as required in the bylaws, the Vice-
Chancellor cited what he saw as: 
[T]he general rule that the stockholders, through bylaws, may dictate 
the process that directors use to manage the corporation, so long as 
the restrictions are not so onerous as to interfere with the board’s 
power to manage the corporation under Section 141(a).203 
To be sure, “onerous” is not the most precise of expressions; the 
Vice Chancellor appears to be using the word as a synonym for 
“discretion-limiting,” as discretion-limiting restrictions would in fact 
interfere with the board’s power. Thus, the Vice Chancellor recites one 
of the central assertions of bylaw governance and the circumscribing 
bylaw theory: that the shareholders’ bylaw power is not defined by 
subject matter (i.e. meeting dates, quorum, etc.) but rather by the degree 
of interference with the board’s managerial discretion. That he cited CA 
in support of this “general rule” supports the interpretation of that case 
offered in this Article. However, I will stop short of contending that the 
Vice Chancellor endorses bylaw governance. It is enough to say that his 
perception of the corporate law is consistent with BG theory.204 
D. UNISUPER’S (EVENTUAL) ACCEPTANCE OF CIRCUMSCRIBING BOARD 
RESTRICTIONS 
The previous section demonstrated that CA and other relevant 
Delaware precedent can be interpreted to validate circumscribing 
bylaws. The courts have also addressed—and validated—corporate 
                                                                                                                 
 202. No. 8626-VCL, 2013 WL 5739680 (Del. Ch. Oct. 11, 2013). 
 203. Id. at *19. 
 204. It is not consistent with every theory. Advocates of director primacy likely take 
issue with Laster’s formulation and contest that it constitutes any sort of general rule. 
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actions that are functionally equivalent to circumscribing bylaws. This 
suggests that the BG theory is firmly established within Delaware 
corporate law, and is not merely the product of a single opinion. 
The most interesting of these precedents is the pair of opinions 
issued by Chancellor Chandler in UniSuper, Ltd v. News Corp.205 The 
first opinion in the case (“UniSuper”)206 was the Chancellor’s original 
ruling on the defendant corporation’s motion to dismiss. The second 
opinion (“UniSuper I-L”)207 certified the first decision for interlocutory 
review by the Delaware Supreme Court. The first opinion used 
reasoning that neither engaged nor commented upon the concept of 
board circumscription, but that reasoning proved deficient in a number 
of ways. Perhaps for that reason, UniSuper I-L largely jettisoned the 
arguments on which UniSuper relied. The UniSuper I-L opinion—which 
the Delaware Supreme Court left undisturbed by declining an 
interlocutory appeal—analyzed the case as a question of whether the 
board’s discretion. In defending his original opinion, the Chancellor in 
essence confirmed the validity of circumscribing bylaws, even as 
applied to substantive managerial issues. 
The facts of the case revolved around a contract between News 
Corp. and a group of its Australian institutional shareholders. In that 
contract, News Corp. had assumed certain corporate governance 
responsibilities in exchange for the shareholders’ assent to its 
reincorporation in Delaware.208 One of the terms of that contract was a 
                                                                                                                 
 205. The first opinion was the original decision on the defendant’s motion to 
dismiss, and can be found at 2005 Del. Ch. LEXIS 205 (Del. Ch. Dec. 20, 2005). The 
second opinion 2006 Del. Ch. LEXIS 11 (Del. Ch. Jan. 19, 2006) certified the decision 
for interlocutory review. 
 206. No. 1699-N, 2005 Del. Ch. LEXIS 205 (Del. Ch. Dec. 20, 2005). 
 207. No. 1699-N, 2006 Del. Ch. LEXIS 11 (Del. Ch. Jan. 19, 2006). As described 
below, the interlocutory opinion defended the original decision, but only by essentially 
abandoning the reasoning of the first opinion in favor of an analysis that closely 
resembles a theory of circumscribing bylaws. Id. 
 208. Id. at *4-6. Technically speaking, the agreement that formed the basis of the 
contract was not obtained by shareholders, but rather by an organization called ASCI, 
described by the court as “non-profit organization that advises Australian pension funds 
on corporate governance.” UniSuper, 2005 Del. Ch. LEXIS 205, at *3. It seems as if 
ASCI was negotiating on behalf of its clients, who were institutional investors. More 
importantly, the agreement it obtained allegedly bound the company to a course of 
conduct, which of course applies to all shareholders equally. Id. Thus, the complaint 
was filed by a group of institutional investors, not by ASCI. Id. at *12. In any event, the 
court treated the agreement as one between institutional shareholders and the company, 
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pill-redemption agreement (“PRA”), according to which the company 
agreed not to implement a poison pill defense for longer than one year 
without obtaining majority shareholder approval. Soon after 
reincorporation, News Corp. was subject to a hostile bid; in response, it 
adopted a poison pill, and one year later, the company extended the 
pill’s duration without obtaining shareholder approval. In response to 
litigation by shareholders seeking to enforce the original agreement, the 
board argued that the PRA was illegal under § 141(a).209 The Chancellor 
disagreed, and found the contract to be enforceable.210 His ruling meant 
that the shareholders were able to prevent the board from implementing 
a poison pill. 
There is little reason to think that UniSuper would have been 
decided differently had the PRA taken the form of a bylaw and not a 
contract. Indeed, bylaws have a stronger claim to validity than contracts 
like the PRA: whereas the latter can be implemented with only the 
support of a small minority interest, bylaws require the assent of a 
shareholder majority. To be sure, the PRA was a joint agreement 
between (a few) shareholders and the board. Perhaps it might be 
contended that the bilateral nature of the agreement put it on a different 
footing than bylaws adopted unilaterally by shareholders. Such an 
argument would run afoul of Quickturn, which established that the 
board could not conjure a special ability to bind its future judgment 
simply by embedding the restriction in a contract.211 It would be 
                                                                                                                 
without any regard to the difference—if any—between the identities of the plaintiffs 
and the investors on whose behalf ASCI originally acted. See id. at *4-8. 
 209. UniSuper, 2005 Del. Ch. LEXIS 205, at *23-26. 
 210. More specifically, enforceable to the extent that an actual contract had been 
breached. The existence of any contract between the board and the shareholders was an 
issue in dispute in the case. See UniSuper I-L, at *16-17. This uncertainty arose from 
the fact that the agreement at issue was not formalized; rather, it was orally negotiated 
behind closed doors, and then memorialized in a News Corp. press release to the public. 
Id. at *17. The company claimed that it was bound only to adopt a board policy (which 
it did), and the subsequent repeal of that policy breached no obligation. Id. Since the 
opinion was issued in response to a motion to dismiss, the court accepted the plaintiffs’ 
allegations that the press release also promised the maintenance of that policy or, in the 
alternative, that the board had agreed to do so in a separate oral contract. Id. at *16-17. 
Since the court based its opinion on the assumption that a contract existed, the analysis 
here will follow suit. See id. at *15-22. 
 211. See supra notes 175 & 176 and accompanying text. The contract in question in 
Quickturn was the option contract that comprised the poison pill extended by the 
company to its shareholders. 
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senseless to waver from that rule just because the party negotiating the 
contract is a shareholder minority. To the extent that the distinction 
between contract and bylaw makes any difference, it should work in 
favor of bylaw validity: the collective agreement of a shareholder 
majority should have a greater claim to legitimacy than a policy effected 
by a minority shareholder interest. If a restriction can be valid so long as 
some shareholders negotiate for it, why require the shareholders’ 
participation in the first place? A board can always find a few 
shareholders to sign on the dotted line in exchange for private benefits. 
If this were to be sufficient, then the directors would in effect be 
permitted to bind themselves. 
On its own terms, UniSuper relied on reasoning that erred on 
several basic points of law. While the outcome of the case was clear—
the Chancellor rejected the company’s argument that constraints on 
board action necessarily violate § 141(a) whenever they limit, in any 
fashion, the board’s discretion212—the original reasoning that supported 
this conclusion cannot withstand serious analysis. Indeed, the first 
UniSuper opinion reads like an outcome in search of a theory.213 This is 
important because Chancellor Chandler would later revise his reasoning 
in an opinion certifying an interlocutory appeal; the logic of that opinion 
was (1) defensible on the merits and (2) not coincidentally, fully 
consistent with BG. To fully appreciate the significance of his revisions, 
it is useful to briefly review how his original opinion went wrong. 
His first mistake was to disregard Delaware law on poison pills, 
presumably unintentionally. He wrote: 
                                                                                                                 
 212. The company also argued that the board’s decision to agree to the terms of the 
contract violated its fiduciary duties. This argument is, strictly speaking, not relevant to 
circumscribing bylaws, which do not require the board to agree and thus do not 
implicate the board’s duties. Thus, only the § 141(a) argument is addressed here. That 
said, the two arguments substantially overlap and the analysis of this section can be 
applied to the fiduciary issue with only minor modifications. 
 213. UniSuper has its defenders, but the defenses support the point advanced here. 
Professor Smith, for instance, has lauded UniSuper as an example of privately ordered 
corporate governance, in which the allocation of power between board and shareholders 
is determined on a firm-by-firm basis. See Smith, supra note 22, at 188 (concluding that 
UniSuper “evinces the potential of private ordering to benefit shareholders in public 
corporations”). In other words, like the Chancellor, he focuses on the outcome of the 
case at the expense of its reasoning. His account of the case is indeed elegant; the point 
made here is that the outcome can be reached only by means of a legal argument that 
recognizes the general validity of circumscribing constraints on the board. 
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The fact that the alleged contract in this case gives power to the 
shareholders saves it from invalidation under Section 141(a). The 
alleged contract with ACSI did not cede power over poison pills to 
an outside group; rather, it ceded that power to shareholders. . . . . 
[W]hen shareholders exercise their right to vote in order to assert 
control over the business and affairs of the corporation the board 
must give way. This is because the board’s power—which is that of 
an agent’s with regard to its principal—derives from the 
shareholders, who are the ultimate holders of power under Delaware 
law.214 
Compare that passage with the following excerpt from the 2001 
Delaware Supreme Court opinion in Account v. Hilton Hotels Corp.215 
It is indisputable that Moran established a board’s authority to adopt 
a rights plan. . . . Moran addressed a fundamental question of 
corporate law in the context of takeovers: whether a board of 
directors had the power to adopt unilaterally a rights plan the effect 
of which was to interpose the board between the shareholders and 
the proponents of a tender offer. The power recognized in Moran 
would have been meaningless if the rights plan required shareholder 
approval. Indeed, it is difficult to harmonize Moran’s basic holding 
with a contention that questions a Board’s prerogative to 
unilaterally establish a rights plan.216 
Hilton’s facts were not directly on point, but its reasoning should 
have controlled.217 Poison pills cannot be used to elicit the best offer 
price from a bidder if the shareholders can veto their use. The purpose of 
a pill, after all, is to force the bidder to secure approval from the board, 
which can negotiate to obtain the bidder’s best price.218 Shareholders, by 
contrast, can only choose between tendering and not tendering. An 
important justification for the pill is that it prevents shareholders from 
choosing to tender so long as the price is acceptable even though it 
                                                                                                                 
 214. UniSuper, at *24-26. 
 215. 780 A.2d 245, 249 (Del. 2001). 
 216. Id. (emphasis added). 
 217. In Hilton, individual shareholders were seeking to opt out of the pill 
unilaterally, rather than putting the pill itself to a shareholder vote. 
 218. See, e.g., Martin Lipton, Pills, Polls, and Professors Redux, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 
1037, 1057 n.77 & 1057-58 (2002) (noting that poison pill operates to the benefit of 
shareholders when it forces potential acquirers to raise their bids in order to convince 
the target board to endorse the offer and dismantle the pill). 
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might not be the maximal price they could obtain.219 The board’s 
leverage to bargain for that maximal price disappears if the shareholders 
can lower (or, in the case of the PRA, choose not to raise) the defenses, 
since the shareholders might do so in response to any minimally 
acceptable bid. Whatever the merits of this reasoning, it has consistently 
been Delaware law for many years, as the Chancellor himself would 
later acknowledge in his final Airgas opinion.220 
In light of this settled precedent, one might have expected the 
Chancellor to distinguish UniSuper on its facts. Instead, he tried to 
evade Hilton’s command with his excursion into agency theory, 
excerpted above.221 This approach to the case could never have worked, 
because directors, simply put, are not agents of the shareholders. To be 
sure, many scholars use agency theory to provide a compelling 
normative theory of the nature of the corporation and a useful positive 
description of the board’s fiduciary duties.222 Agency theory, however, 
cannot be a complete or fully accurate account of the relationship 
between shareholders and director, because the corporate law departs 
from agency law on a number of important issues, such as the 
distribution of capital223 and the board’s unilateral ability to deploy a 
poison pill.224 In any event, Hilton itself had specifically rejected an 
                                                                                                                 
 219. Id. at 1041-42. 
 220. See Air Prods. & Chems, Inc. v. Airgas, Inc., 16 A.3d 48, 57-58 (Del. Ch. 
2011) (stating the Chancellor’s “personal view [that]Airgas’s poison pill has served its 
legitimate purpose” but admitting that he was bound by precedent that “selection of a 
time frame for achievement of corporate goals . . . may not be delegated to the 
stockholders.”). 
 221. See UniSuper, Ltd v. News Corp, No. 1699-N, 2005 Del. Ch. LEXIS 205, *33 
(Del. Ch. Dec. 20, 2005) (asserting that “[w]here the principal [the shareholders] makes 
known to the agent [the board] exactly which actions the principal wishes to be taken, 
the agent must act in accordance with those instructions”). See also supra note 214 and 
accompanying text. 
 222. The most famous work expounding this view was the seminal paper: Frank H. 
Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target’s Management in 
Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1161 (1981). 
 223. See Lynn A. Stout, The Shareholder as Ulysses: Some Empirical Evidence on 
Why Investors in Public Corporations Tolerate Board Governance, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 
667, 677 (2003) (noting that it is “difficult to reconcile” the view that directors are 
shareholders’ agents with the “fundamental reality of corporate law” that shareholders 
can neither pay themselves dividends nor force the board to do so). 
 224. See, e.g., Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, How I Learned to Stop Worrying 
and Love the Pill: Adaptive Responses to Takeover Law, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 871, 909 
(2003) (noting that “poison pills are adopted unilaterally by the board of directors” and 
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agency-based view of the board’s power, which makes the Chancellor’s 
decision to rely on that normative argument all the more puzzling. 
By appealing to agency theory, the Chancellor overlooked a useful, 
readily available factual distinction. Hilton had addressed the board’s 
power to deploy a pill;225 the issue presented in UniSuper was the 
indispensability of that power. While the former question has, as noted 
above, been engaged frequently by the Delaware courts, the latter 
question has never been decided. Never has the Court required the board 
to deploy a pill, nor has it held that the board’s power to deploy a pill 
cannot be compromised.226 Moreover, News Corp. could not force a 
merits consideration of the indispensability issue, because it was not yet 
ripe on the facts of the case presented to the court. After all, the 
measures that the company retained under the PRA227 might have been 
sufficient to fend off hostile bids. In the absence of an actual hostile bid, 
the court would have neither the occasion nor the means to determine 
whether the board actually needed the pill to fulfill its fiduciary duties. 
Had the case been framed this way, existing precedent would have 
supported the Chancellor’s position. The Chancellor could have reached 
the same result—i.e. rejecting the company’s motion to dismiss—
                                                                                                                 
that “the fact that the pill did not require shareholder approval was one of its main 
attractions”). 
 225. See supra note 216 and accompanying text. 
 226. Indeed, the Court has implied that the board’s power to redeem a pill can be 
altered in the certificate. See Carmody v. Toll Bros., 723 A.2d 1180, 1191 (Del. 1997) 
(holding that because “the Rights Plan’s allocation of voting power to redeem the 
Rights is nowhere found in the Toll Brothers certificate of incorporation, the complaint 
states a claim that the ‘dead hand’ feature of the Rights Plan is . . . statutorily invalid 
under Delaware law”). It would be bizarre if the power to implement a pill could not be 
similarly altered in the certificate. 
 227. For instance, a staggered board is, in itself, an impediment to a hostile 
takeover, since it would still take the bidder two election cycles to obtain majority 
representation on the board. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(k)(1) (providing that 
directors on staggered boards can be removed only “for cause.”). So too do target firms 
enjoy the protections of § 203, which prevents a 15% holder of a target company’s 
stock from merging with the target for three years, unless it obtains board approval 
before becoming a 15% holder, acquires 85% of the outstanding stock in its tender 
offer, or receives the approval of a supermajority of minority stockholders. Neither of 
the last two conditions is trivial, which alone incentivizes acquirers to negotiate friendly 
transactions instead of proceeding with a hostile tender offer. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 
8, § 203(a)(2). 
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without contradicting controlling precedent or relying on ill-considered 
theories about gap-filling in corporate contracts.228 
Ultimately, the Chancellor came to embrace this factual distinction 
in UniSuper I-L, when he reconsidered and restated his original 
UniSuper argument. Some commentators have characterized UniSuper 
I-L as a “clarification” of the original opinion,229 but, in fact, it 
thoroughly recast the underlying legal analysis. Agency law was 
completely absent from the discussion of § 141(a), replaced by the 
following justification for the contract’s enforceability: 
The fact (if it is a fact) that the News Corp. board agreed to cede part 
of its authority over a discrete question (extension of the Company’s 
poison pill) to the Company’s owners (the shareholders at         
large) . . . .230 
In the context of the case, this sentence is highly significant. It 
shows that the reasoning of the original UniSuper had been abandoned. 
A new argument—that the PRA was valid because it so minimally 
interfered with the directors’ overall authority—had become central to 
the case holding. The original UniSuper opinion did not even consider 
the extent of the board’s cessation of power, and implied that the board 
could have relinquished any amount of its control, so long as it was 
                                                                                                                 
 228. In particular, the Chancellor’s statement that “[s]hareholders should be 
permitted to fill a particular gap in the corporate contract if they wish to fill it” so 
wholly contradicts basic tenets of Delaware law that one supposes he could not really 
have meant what he wrote. Not even the most ardent proponent of an agency model of 
the corporation would endorse this statement as an accurate description of the law. For 
example, shareholders cannot fill the gaps in the corporate contract by deciding to 
indemnify directors against liability for bad faith actions. See, e.g., Waltuch v. 
ContiCommodity Servs, Inc., 88 F.3d 87 (2d Cir. 1996). Nor can they expand the scope 
or strictness of the directors’ fiduciary duties. It has never been suggested to or by a 
Delaware court, for instance, that shareholders can alter the duty of loyalty so that 
directors are required to present corporate opportunities to the board before taking 
them. See, e.g., Broz v. Cellular Info. Sys., Inc., 673 A.2d 148, 157 (Del. 1996) 
(holding that “if [a] director or officer believes . . . that the corporation is not entitled to 
the opportunity, then he may take it for himself” and reiterating that “[i]t is not the law 
of Delaware that presentation to the board is a necessary prerequisite to a finding that a 
corporate opportunity has not been usurped”). Perhaps such a thing could be done in 
the certificate, but of course, the certificate is itself the contract, not a gap-filling 
measure, and it cannot be modified by the shareholders. 
 229. See, e.g., Frederick Alexander & James Honaker, Power to the Franchise or 
the Fiduciaries: An Analysis of the Limits on Stockholder Activist Bylaws, 33 DEL. J. 
CORP. LAW 749, 756 n.24 (2008). 
 230. UniSuper I-L, 2006 Del. Ch. LEXIS 11, at *10 (emphasis added). 
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relinquished to the shareholders. By contrast, UniSuper I-L treated the 
narrowness of the board restriction (and by implication, the retention by 
the board of most of its authority) as the dispositive factor. 
This renewed focus on the extent to which the board’s power had 
actually been compromised was ultimately an endorsement of the theory 
of circumscribing bylaws. It was this theory that was presented to the 
Court by the certification order, and thus this theory that the court 
implicitly blessed by declining to hear the interlocutory appeal. The 
Court’s only response to UniSuper I-L was a brief order noting that, 
even though it “generally . . . gives substantial deference to the trial 
judge’s recommendation” on interlocutory appeals, “the interests of 
justice are best served if these proceedings are not interrupted by an 
interlocutory appeal.”231 Had the Court disapproved of UniSuper, CA 
gave it a ready opportunity to cabin it to its facts—for instance, by 
observing that the PRA was an example of a substantive issue unsuitable 
for bylaw inclusion. Admittedly, only the weakest of inferences can be 
drawn from the Court’s decision not to include dicta criticizing 
UniSuper in a subsequent case.232 Still, what limited evidence that we 
have points to a judicial acceptance of the circumscribing bylaw theory. 
In summary, if UniSuper I-L remains the last word on the issue of 
the validity of shareholder agreements that bind the board, it would 
seem to weigh in favor of a legal principle under which circumscribing 
bylaws would also be valid. 
CONCLUSION: BG AND FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS 
This Article has set forth two interrelated arguments. One lies in the 
sphere of positive law, and contends that shareholders in fact have more 
power to enforce substantive bylaws against the board than is commonly 
assumed. While they cannot control the board, they may circumscribe its 
authority. The other, more normative argument concerns the 
implications of that doctrine of bylaw validity for corporate governance. 
                                                                                                                 
 231. News Corp. v. UniSuper Ltd., 906 A.2d 138, 139 (Del. 2006). Notably, 
Professors Hu and Westbrook observe that the Court’s decision not to hear the appeal 
came as “much surprise to the bar.” See Henry T. C. Hu & Jay Lawrence Westbrook, 
Abolition of the Corporate Duty to Creditors, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1321, 1389 (2007). 
 232. It did, after all, describe hypothetical bylaw provisions that would be 
considered procedural even though they had substantive ramifications. It could have 
also described, by means of contrast, a bylaw provision that would in fact be considered 
substantive. 
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The normative argument cannot be fully appreciated until the issues 
of positive law are fully resolved. As argued in Part II, the Delaware 
bylaw case law is messy. The CA case purports to articulate a test for 
bylaw validity, but the test is wholly inadequate. It is based on a 
distinction between types of bylaws that is both incoherent and 
incomplete; it exists in significant tension with prior precedent; its 
exposition relies on far-fetched hypotheticals; and it is not even 
consistent with the outcome of the case. The Court must revisit the 
issue. This Article suggests how it might re-articulate the doctrine 
consistent with both the spirit of CA and the holdings of prior case law. 
This revision turns on the distinction between circumscribing and 
controlling bylaws, and would hold that the former are presumptively 
valid, whereas the latter are definitively invalid. 
 
